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ABSTRACT
The advances in wireless technologies have led to autonomous deployments of various wireless
networks. As these networks must co-exist, it is important that all transmitters and receivers are
aware of their radio frequency (RF) surroundings so that they can learn and adapt their transmis-
sion and reception parameters to best suit their needs. To this end, machine learning techniques
have become popular as they can learn, analyze and even predict the RF signals and associated
parameters that characterize the RF environment.
In this dissertation, we address some of the fundamental challenges on how to effectively apply
different learning techniques in the RF domain. In the presence of adversaries, malicious activities
such as jamming, and spoofing are inevitable which render most machine learning techniques inef-
fective. To facilitate learning in such settings, we propose an adversarial learning-based approach
to detect unauthorized exploitation of RF spectrum. First, we show the applicability of existing
machine learning algorithms in the RF domain. We design and implement three recurrent neural
networks using different types of cell models for fingerprinting RF transmitters. Next, we focus on
securing transmissions on dynamic spectrum access network where primary user emulation (PUE)
attacks can pose a significant threat. We present a generative adversarial net (GAN) based solu-
tion to counter such PUE attacks. Ultimately, we propose recurrent neural network models which
are able to accurately predict the primary users’ activities in DSA networks so that the secondary
users can opportunistically access the shared spectrum. We implement the proposed learning mod-
els on testbeds consisting of Universal Software Radio Peripherals (USRPs) working as Software
Defined Radios (SDRs). Results reveal significant accuracy gains in accurately characterizing RF
transmitters- thereby demonstrating the potential of our models for real world deployments.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous use of wireless services and applications have become ingrained in every aspect
of our lives. We depend on wireless technologies not only for our smart phones but also for
other applications like telemetry, surveillance, emitter location, radio navigation, jamming, anti-
jamming, radar detection, UAV surveillance, navigation, and location tracking. With such large
scale dependence on use of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum, it becomes imperative that we
manage and use the limited available spectrum in the most efficient manner possible. In order to
do that, one needs to better understand the ambient signal characteristics for optimal deployment
of wireless infrastructure and efficient resource provisioning.
Design of new wireless technologies and deployment of wireless networks using those technolo-
gies must take into consideration several factors including detection and monitoring of encroach-
ment, ability to predict RF propagation and coverage, techniques to mitigate noise, policies en-
abling spectrum sharing, characterization of frequencies and waveforms, coverage analysis for
optimal deployment, detection and de-confliction and more importantly identification of adversar-
ial RF signals. Furthermore, the advent of dynamic spectrum access enabled by the use of software
defined radios is pushing the frontiers of wireless communications. These radios are expected to
constantly monitor the radio environment and the resulting data can be used to learn about their
surroundings so that they can intelligently adapt their RF parameters (e.g., operating frequency,
bandwidth, waveform, modulation, noise mitigation) to meet their desired objectives.
In order to best use the radio resources in both the spatial and time domains, and to maximize the
spectral efficiency, past and current knowledge of the RF signals are important. Though sensing
mechanisms can be used to assess the current environment, learning techniques are typically used
to analyze the past observations and predict future occurrences of events related to a signal. With
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the proven success of machine learning (ML) techniques in various domains, such techniques are
also being sought for characterizing and understanding the RF environment. Some of the goals of
the learning techniques in the RF domain are emitter fingerprinting, emitter localization, modula-
tion recognition, feature learning, attention and saliency, autonomous RF sensor configuration and
waveform synthesis.
ML techniques allow the radios to learn and adapt their RF parameters so as to optimize their
respective objectives. Such adaptation by the radios is achieved by exposing their configuration
options to make the operational parameters flexible and tunable. As a consequence, the config-
urability and adaptability features open up avenues for manipulation as well where a radio can be
induced to learn false information by adversaries [9]. This creates an unique set of challenges in
the domain of Radio Frequency Machine Learning (RFML) systems which makes implementing
ML algorithms for RF systems way more challenging.
In this chapter, we discuss the recent trends of facilitating learning in the RF domain using different
machine learning approaches. These ML techniques have their own strengths and weaknesses
depending on the context and the type of dataset being used. We start by broadly classifying the
ML techniques into supervised and unsupervised learning, and highlight the various schemes that
have been used in the RF domain. Then, we discuss five techniques that are currently being widely
explored as they exhibit promising results for future implementations. These are: i) Support Vector
Machine (SVM), ii) Deep Neural Networks (DNN), iii) Convolutional Neural Network (CNN),
iv) Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), and v) Non-parametric Bayesian Classifier. SVM and the
three neural networks (NN) perform better with continuous and multi-dimensional datasets, which
could be leveraged when the RF signals contain multiple attributes. However, applicability of
SVM and NN comes at a cost: they exhibit high variance sensitivity. On the other hand, Bayesian
classifiers are advanced statistical techniques for classifying and identifying features. In spite of
these developments, we argue that the ML techniques have their limitations in an adversarial setting
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i.e., if adversarial RF signals are present during the learning and/or classification process. We show
that approaches based on the relatively new generative adversarial nets (GAN) are well-suited for
learning in adversarial RF environments and are able to distinguish between adversarial and trusted
signals and sources. We also discuss the effectiveness if transmitter fingerprinting technique, the
basics of primary user emulation attack in the dynamic spectrum access (DSA) regime.
1.1 Machine Learning for RF Signals
The basic work flow of any machine learning algorithm starts with digesting the feature space.
Most often the quality of the model learned by the algorithm depends heavily on the quality of the
features used as input to the algorithm which in turn depends on the problem. Thus for example,
even though the RF data may consist of the RSSI values for a given problem, using the raw input
in this form may not result in the optimal model. In such cases it might be helpful to transform
the raw input features into a higher/lower dimensional feature space that succinctly captures the
essence of the problem thereby making it easier to learn better ML models for the problem. Fig. 1.1
shows the classification of different machine learning algorithms that have been used for learning



















































Figure 1.1: Classification of Machine Learning Algorithms in the RF Domain
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1.1.1 Supervised Learning in RF Domain
Supervised learning algorithms are a set of learning algorithms where a set of mutually exclusive
labeled data is used for building the learning model (also called training). One of the simplest
supervised learning algorithm is based on the K-nearest neighbor (KNN) search. The KNN algo-
rithm classifies previously unseen data based on the labels of nearest data samples that are included
in the training set. Algorithms based on KNN searches are usually very computation intensive, spe-
cially in the higher dimensions where the dimension of the feature space factors into the running
time of the known algorithms for computing KNNs. This also makes algorithms based on KNN
search unsuitable for the RF domain. Furthermore, KNN may not provide optimal performance
for higher dimensional dataset, which is often the case for RF signal data. Another set of super-
vised learning algorithms are based on the idea of decision trees. Decision trees are used to assign
specific class labels to the items using predictive modeling based on the values of the features asso-
ciated with the item of interest. The decision trees perform well with high dimensional data, which
could be advantageous for handling multidimensional RF data, however longer training time and
lack of accuracy could hinder usefulness in mission critical applications as is most often the case
with RF processing. Another important class of supervised algorithms are based on the idea of
Bayesian classifiers. Bayesian classifiers predict the probability of a given sample belonging to a
particular class using a priori knowledge. A specific category of Bayesian classifier is the Naïve
Bayes, where one assumes that each feature contributes towards the classification and are mutually
correlated. Since different parameters from the same kind of radios can be considered as mutu-
ally correlated, Naïve Bayes can potentially be used successfully in the RF domain. Naïve Bayes
also works reasonably well with limited training data and is less likely to suffer from overfitting.
However, the predictions are less accurate compared to the other methods like neural networks.
We defer our discussions on SVMs, DNN, CNN, and RNN to Section 1.2 as they have shown
promising results in the RF domain and thus deserve to be discussed in details.
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1.1.2 Unsupervised Learning in RF Domain
Unsupervised learning algorithms are a set of algorithms where there is no explicit training phase
for building a model from labelled data as is done with the supervised algorithms. These algo-
rithms make inference from the unlabelled data, most often exploiting the observed variance of the
data and their association relative to each other. K-means clustering is one such learning algorithm
where the observed data is partitioned into clusters using information about the distance between
the data points (or more generally using the similarity between the observed data points). New data
is assigned to a cluster such that the data point is closest to a particular cluster mean. Another set of
clustering algorithms are based on the idea of hierarchies. Here the items of interest are progres-
sively partitioned into a hierarchy of clusters, the clusters which are higher up in the hierarchy are
coarse whereas the ones that are lower are more fine grained. Hierarchical clustering can be used
for transmitter identification and classification where the number of entities are unknown. Another
set of unsupervised algorithms concerns with the problem of dimensionality reduction. Dimen-
sionality reduction aims to identify a subspace of the feature space such that the projection of the
data into the subspace (which has a lower dimension than the feature space) would explain most
of the variation observed in the data. Principal component analysis (PCA) is one such method for
dimensionality reduction and data compression. PCA can be very useful for the multi-dimensional
RF data as it can be leveraged to speed up the underlying classification or regression algorithms
when faster online learning and processing is required.
The final and most important category of unsupervised algorithms for the RF domain is the Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [32]. It is a relatively new class of algorithms that have been
shown to perform well in adversarial settings. GANs use a generative model which enables the
realistic generation of samples from a given distribution which can then be used to train a discrim-
inator for identifying real samples drawn from the distribution as opposed to fake ones obtained
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from the generator.
1.2 Important ML Algorithms for RF Domain
In this section, we describe the ML techniques that have been most successful in characterizing
the RF environment by identifying and differentiating signals from different kinds of transmitters
like broadcast radio, local and wide area data and voice radios, radars etc. Support vector ma-
chine (SVM) was one of the earliest algorithms used due to the availability of different standard
library packages and its applicability to multi-dimensional labeled dataset. However, neural net-
work based classification have become popular in recent times as they are flexible with the learning
parameters and also yield better accuracy. As far as unsupervised learning is concerned, there are
a few efforts towards RF parameter identification, the non-parametric version of the Bayesian clas-
sifier probably being the most successful one.
1.2.1 Support Vector Machine
SVMs have been one of the most successful classical machine learning algorithms and have been
applied to a vast array of problems. SVM is a discriminative classifier using supervised learning
and generates an optimal hyperplane for data classification and identification. It has been applied
to the RF domain for transmitter identification using fingerprinting. At its heart SVMs are bi-
nary classifiers that assume that the data is linearly separable and computes the optimal separating
hyperplane by solving a quadratic program on the space defined by the training data.
SVMs have been successfully applied for the task of transmitter identification using the RF finger-
print of the transmitter. In [43], Kroon et al. presented a RF fingerprinting technique for banning
prohibited transmitters from accessing the cellular base stations. They proposed a customized en-
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semble classifier based on the probability density of a SVM classifier, which achieved 97% true
positives and 80% true negative rates.
However in recent times, the research trends on RF fingerprinting is shifting towards using raw
signal data as compared to using hand engineered features. This has also been facilitated by the
availability of automatic feature learning systems like the multi layer perceptron. In [40], Youssef
et al. investigated different ML strategies including SVM and neural networks using raw I/Q data,
rather than using any hand-engineered features. I/Q data consists of complex-valued in-phase (I)
and quadrature (Q) component in a signal data constellation. Their implementation produces good
training accuracy of 87.6% but poor test accuracy of 67.6%.
SVM classifiers are relatively easy to implement and can be extended for higher dimensional data.
However, achieving a high accuracy remains a challenge. Furthermore, SVM implementations do
not typically consider any adversarial situation; thus, when malicious entities try to pass as a trusted
device, the SVM classifier has no way of determining its true identity and thus would incorrectly
classify it as one of the trusted devices. This makes the possibility of using SVMs in adversarial
settings quite low. Moreover SVMs require hand engineered features even when raw I/Q data is
used. As a result of these drawbacks and the recent resurgence of neural networks attention as
turned to using the same for RFML applications.
1.2.2 Deep Neural Networks
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have revolutionized the field of artificial intelligence in the last few
years. The problems tackled by DNNs range over Computer Vision, Natural Language Processing,
Speech Processing and so on. They have been shown to perform better than humans, for some
of these problems. More recently, [65] and [67] have shown the efficacy of using DNNs in RF
communication systems. In [65], Shea et al. presented a modulation recognition approach using
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DNN, achieving nearly 82%-87% accuracy. They used a synthetic dataset consisting of 11 widely
used modulations: 8 digital and 3 analog modulations. Their RF fingerprinting was based on the
modulation type which was used as the primary input feature (for the network which then computes
more complex features for model learning).
The automatic features learned by DNNs are often times better and more informative than the hand
engineered features used for SVMs and hence the DNNs yield better accuracy. However DNNs do
not perform as well for datasets with spatial and temporal correlations, which is the case for the RF
domain. RF signals exhibit high spatial correlation (e.g., modulation schemes) or high temporal
correlation (e.g., I/Q signal data) or both and in order for a system to work well with RF data these
correlations need to be exploited by the learning system. Furthermore, DNNs have shown to be
susceptible to malicious attacks and fails to distinguish rogue transmitters from trusted ones [68]
in the presence of active adversaries.
1.2.3 Convolutional Neural Networks
Fully connected DNNs are like standard neural networks but with a lot more hidden layers. How-
ever, these networks can be augmented with convolutional layers for faster training and for en-
abling the network to learn more compact and meaningful representations. Deep Convolutional
Neural Networks (DCNN) have been shown to be effective for several different tasks in communi-
cation. There have been quite a few attempts at using DCNN for learning different RF parameters.
One such effort is presented in [68], where Shea et al. presented an optimized DCNN model (with
18 layers) for recognition of modulation schemes for a large synthetic dataset (consisting of 24
modulation schemes), as well as over-the-air data. 94% accuracy on synthetic data and 87% ac-
curacy on over-the-air data, were achieved. Inspired from this and buoyed by the success of the
application of CNNs in communication, Youssef et al. presented a CNN architecture [40] for deep
feature embedding, transmitter identification and classification.
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CNN works with several filters that capture the spatial correlation within the input features for the
purpose of computing lower level features that effectively capture the spatial correlation between
the input features. A cascade of such filters are used for propagation of these features through
multiple layers, in effect computing more low level features, thereby giving the best solution for
datasets having spatially correlated features. However, it does not perform well in general for
datasets where the features are uncorrelated, for example the rise time which is a feature that can
be computed for many RF datasets. CNNs may not perform well if the nature of the correlations
change from the training data to the test data. This is because in such cases the features computed
through the different filters on the training data will not be applicable to the test data. It is also not
recommended for time series data where temporal correlations might exist. Moreover, CNNs have
the same limitations as DNNs in regards to immunity from malicious attacks.
1.2.4 Recurrent Neural Networks
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are capable of predictions with time series data. They have been
shown to work well with speaker recognition tasks [74] and inspired by this and based on the fact
that the raw RF signal data from the transmitter represent a time series, RNN can be considered
as a potential model to build a system for learning transmitter embedding and classification. One
variant of RNN is long short term memory (LSTM) [28], which has been successfully used for
modeling temporal data such as speech. The problem of estimating the noise from the signal,
requires analysis of the temporal data because the noise characteristics can only be estimated by
looking at the received signal over time.
In order to estimate the noise, any system needs to “listen” to the underlying signal for sometime
and “remember” the same, for noise estimation. Previously, neural networks lacked this capability.
Another issue was the problem of vanishing gradients, when trying to use back propagation with
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temporal data. However, both these problems were solved by the invention of gated units, such as
the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM), the Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU), and their variants.
In [73], Sreeraj et al. presented a 2-layer LSTM model to perform modulation recognition over
the synthetic dataset of 11 modulation schemes. Accuracies close to 90% was achieved for data
with high signal to noise ratio coupled with time domain data. This implementation establishes
the feasibility of using recurrent neural network models for learning RF features related to time
domain analysis. However, effectiveness of LSTM models for learning other RF parameters is still
an open research challenge.
RNN performs well with temporally correlated dataset through the implementation of the con-
cepts of “memory” and “gates”. However it responds poorly to spatially correlated data. RNN
implementations also incorrectly classify the rogue data as one of the trusted ones when active
adversaries spoof the signals as coming from trusted sources in cases where they are not.
1.2.5 Non-parametric Bayesian Classifier
A non-parametric Bayes classifier is an unsupervised learning strategy which uses a probability
density estimator to determine the probability of an observation belonging to a particular class.
Nguyen et al. presented a non-parametric Bayesian learning [59] approach to identify wireless
devices by characterizing their fingerprints. They considered a device dependent feature space
modeled as multivariate Gaussian distribution, which includes frequency difference and phase shift
difference as dominant features. The non-parametric Bayesian learning approach is then employed
over the generated distributions and used to identify the unknown number of clusters. Experimental
results reveal that the proposed method was capable of clustering 1 to 4 Zigbee transmitting devices
with a 100% hit rate. Next, they showed that the proposed RF fingerprinting approach can be
applied for intrusion detection for Sybil and masquerade attacks by spoofing the MAC address.
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There is still a dearth of methods that are resilient to any general type of attacks for RFML systems.
1.2.6 Comparison of Different ML Techniques
Analyzing the potential of different kinds of ML approaches in RF parameter learning, we summa-
rize that (a) SVM struggles to achieve high accuracies for higher dimensional datasets, (b) DNN is
best suited for fixed valued RF parameters (e.g., rise time), (c) CNN works well with RF parame-
ters that exhibit high spatial correlations (e.g., modulation techniques), (d) RNN is the best option
for RF parameters with high temporal correlations (e.g., I/Q signal data), and (e) Non-parametric
Bayesian classifiers are limited to specific type of applications and datasets.
It must be noted that all the aforementioned ML techniques are susceptible to attackers. Once the
attacker gets to know of the features used by the learning engine, it becomes easy for the attacker
to mislead the learning process. The same applies in the RF domain where a RF transmitter can
spoof the signals of others and remain undetected.
1.3 Adversarial Learning via GAN
The idea of a generative adversarial net (GAN) [32] in machine learning is based on synergistic
application of ideas from game theory and unsupervised learning. It consists of two competing
systems: a generator (adversary) and a discriminator. The input from the “adversaries” is used to
build robust discriminative models that can operate in the presence of real adversaries. The over-
all training mechanism can be conceptualized as a min-max game with two players, namely the
generator and the discriminator. They help each other to improve themselves through an iterative
training process. Though in theory, the generator and discriminator should play the game indefi-
nitely, in reality, depending on the ratio of data and model density, the discriminator overpowers
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the generator in a finite amount of time, due to the vanishing gradient of the generator. In prac-
tice, this results in generating more accurate and robust ML models. Note that the discriminator
implementation is made deeper than the generator in order to get a purposeful implementation of
the GAN framework.
1.4 Transmitter Fingerprinting
The ubiquitous usage of wirelessly connected Internet-of-Things (IoT) [99] along with the deploy-
ment of wireless autonomous systems has ushered in a new era of industrial scale deployment
of radio frequency (RF) devices. This prevalence of large scale peer-to-peer communication and
the nature of the underlying ubiquitous network brings forth the challenge of accurately identify-
ing a RF transmitter. Every device that is part of a large network needs to be able to identify its
peers with high confidence in order to set up secure communication channels. One of the ways in
which this is done is through the interchange of “keys” [84] for host identification. However, such
schemes are prone to breaches by malicious agents [90] because often the actual implementations
of such systems are not cryptographically sound. In order to get around the problem of faulty im-
plementations, one can use the transmitter’s intrinsic characteristics to create a “fingerprint” that
can be used by a transmitter identification system. Every transmitter, no matter how similar, has
intrinsic characteristics because of the imperfections in its underlying components such as ampli-
fiers, filters, frequency mixers as well as the physical properties of the transmitting antenna; these
characteristics are unique to a specific transmitter. The inaccuracies present in the manufacturing
process and the idiosyncrasies of the hardware circuitry also contribute to the spatial and temporal
characteristics of the signal transmitted through a particular device.
Those inherent heterogeneity can be exploited to create unique identifiers for the transmitters. One
such property is the imbalance in the Inphase (I) and Quadrature (Q) phase components of the
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signal (I/Q data). However, because of the sheer number of the transmitters involved, manually
“fingerprinting” each and every transmitter is not a feasible task [21]. Thus, in order to build such
a system, there needs to be an “automatic” method of extracting the transmitter characteristics and
using the resulting “fingerprint” for the differentiation process. One way of achieving this is by
learning the representation of the transmitter in an appropriate “feature space” that has enough dis-
criminating capability so as to be able to differentiate between “apparently identical” transmitters.
Among the various approaches that can be used to discern this feature space, deep learning (DL [45])
based methods provide an efficient and automatic way of learning and characterizing the feature
space. They are able to learn and analyze the inherent properties of large deployments and use
it to predict and characterize the associated parameters for the task of automatic feature learning
for classification (or regression). Deep neural networks have been shown to be effective for au-
tomatically learning discriminating features from data for various tasks [31]. With proper choice
of the neural network architecture and associated parameters, they can compute arbitrarily good
function approximations [48]. Since the task of classification is equivalent to learning the decision
boundary, neural networks have been a natural candidate for a learning machine.
1.5 Primary User Emulation Attack
The opportunity for abundant usage of wireless devices has created an overly crowded radio spec-
trum and led to the scarcity in spectrum availability. In order to deal with this different pervasive
measures are taken to deal with competitive nature of the spectrum availability. However, studies
have shown that a large portion of licensed spectrum is unused at any given time or location [54].
To exploit such unused spectrum, the concept of dynamic spectrum access (DSA) was envisioned.
The deployment of such spectrum management approach requires the use of intelligent systems at
lower levels of the communication stack, even at the end users. Cognitive radio networks (CRN)
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have proven its competence for such deployments [107]. The basic idea of DSA is to allow some
unlicensed users (secondary users) to opportunistically access the spectrum of the licensed users
(primary users) when the spectrum is not in use. The rules strictly restrict any harmful overlap or
pretentious use of spectrum by secondary users (SUs) when primary users (PUs) are present. The
cognitive properties of CRN, enable the radio devices to take decision on how to manage spec-
trum for both PUs and SUs. One important challenge in order to achieve the goal of ideal CRN
deployment is ensuring the security of PUs.
Most of the research on such spectrum allocation and management techniques for DSA deploy-
ment, are build on the assumption that all participants are cooperative, honest, and the network is
without the presence of adversaries. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [27] man-
dated that all SUs must release the occupied spectral band as soon as any PU starts to transmit
in that band, ensuring full privacy and availability for the licensed users. However, since till now
the CRN network deployments are lacking any measure to implement the security guidelines [10],
a situation could arise where the PUs get denied the required spectrum due to the presence of a
malicious SU. This threat could be categorized as denial-of service (DoS) attack [39]. An adver-
sarial SU could pose itself as a PU by transmitting the signal with characteristics identical to the
PU. Such malicious SUs could threaten the integrity of the CRN in two ways: (i) by preempting
the existing SUs in any spectral band, by posing as a PU; and (ii) by fooling the spectrum man-
ager to deny the PU, as the malicious SU is impersonating itself as a valid PU. Such malicious
deployment of large scale can hijack the entire white space of any spectrum band, thus launching a
“DoS” attack on the legitimate SUs and PUs. Such attacks were first described by Chen et al. [15]
as primary user emulation (PUE) attacks.
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1.6 Primary User’s Activity Prediction
The ever-increasing demands for spectrum access from different emerging wireless applications
have made it necessary to better manage and utilize the radio spectrum. The successful deploy-
ment of such spectrum management approaches requires intelligent and adaptive systems, in order
to accurately assess the radio environment such that unlicensed (secondary) users are able to op-
portunistically access the spectrum of licensed (primary) users when such spectrum is not in use,
thereby increasing the spectrum utilization. However, such spectrum management and deployment
practices must take into account the fact that spectrum access policies prohibit any interference vi-
olation by the secondary users (SUs) when primary users (PUs) use the spectrum. The Citizens
Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) [82] is an example of a DSA implementation, where variety of
commercial users share the 3.5 GHz band with incumbent federal and non-federal licensed users.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [27] mandated that all SUs must release the
occupied spectral bands as soon as any PU starts to transmit on that band, ensuring uninterrupted
availability to the licensed users. To ensure this, the SUs must have knowledge about the spectrum
availability. This awareness is typically achieved by sensing the transmission activities on the
target spectrum bands using various techniques like: use of beacons, geolocation database, and
local energy sensing at the receivers [52, 108].
In this dissertation, we focus on spectrum sensing performed at a central spectrum sensor (SS), as
the use of a centralized SS has broaden applications and lower infrastructure costs [103].
We illustrate the various aspects of spectrum sensing in Fig. 1.2. The first row represents the
PU’s ON-OFF activity and the remaining rows show the SU’s activities that include sensing and
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Figure 1.2: Typical Spectrum Sensing Scenarios
Note that the first two strategies do not involve separate SS and we also assume that the SUs sense
the spectrum continuously. The last two strategies involve the SUs deciding to access the spectrum
based on the information obtained from a local centralized SS. Thus in the first case, a conserva-
tive strategy is imposed on the SU for use of the channel. The cognitive SU continuously senses
the channel and whenever it finds that the channel is free, it transmits in the next timestamp, go-
ing back to the sensing state after that. The second strategy is also conservative but here the SU
transmits in bursty mode. Both these conservative strategies aim to avoid interference violations;
however, under-utilization is high. As for the third strategy, the spectrum sensors send information
to secondary user whenever it senses the channel to be free. The secondary user transmits from
one timestamp and consults the spectrum sensor for the next timestamp. Note that here we assume
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that the time taken to consult the spectrum sensor is less than the spectrum sensing time. This as-
sumption coupled with the strategy minimizes the under-utilization of the previous two strategies.
The fourth strategy is proposed in this dissertation. In this case, the spectrum sensor is intelligent
and trained over the historical data of primary user activity. It can predict the primary use’s activity
for the next timestamp. The secondary user uses that prediction to transmit in bursty mode. It is
evident from all the four strategies that long term prediction from the SS enables the SU to transmit
efficiently over the shared channel by minimizing both the under-utilization and the interference
violations.
1.7 Contribution of this Dissertation
This dissertation focuses on four approaches to address some of the fundamental challenges on
how to apply different learning techniques in the RF domain. (1) First, we propose an adversarial
learning based approach to detect malicious attacks in the RF domain. (2) We explore the spatio-
temporal properties in RF data for fingerprinting of RF transmitters. (3) We propose a defense
mechanism against primary user emulation attacks using generative adversarial network based
learning for dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks. (4) Lastly, we propose a machine learning
model for primary user activity prediction in DSA networks using recurrent structures. We show
the applicability of existing machine learning algorithms in RF domain is feasible. Those learning
techniques can be leveraged to different cheap and robust security measures in dynamic spectrum
access era of RF transmission in general. The designed models, and testbed evaluations show
the significant accuracy over real collected dataset, therefore portraying feasible scenarios of real-
world deployment. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. We propose and implement the Radio Frequency Adversarial Learning (RFAL) framework
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using a GAN with two primary components: i) a generative model that uses a deep neural
network (DNN) for generating fake (aka, counterfeited) signals that closely resembles the
real signals, by deducing the parameter space and replicating the time-invariant features
and ii) a discriminative model that also uses a neural network (DNN) to distinguish trusted
transmitters from rogue ones. During the learning phase, the outcome of the decision process
is fed to the generative model, allowing the adversary (generator) to update its model. The
generator thus serves as a compact front-end for mimicking a transmitter (rogue transmitter
in this case).
2. Once RFAL detects the trusted transmitters from the rogue ones, RFAL uses standard NN
models to differentiate between the different trusted transmitters. RFAL first uses a con-
volutional neural network (CNN) which leverages the correlation between the complex-
valued I/Q data constellations. We also test RFAL using a fully connected deep neural
network (DNN) that improves upon the accuracy of the CNN. Finally, a recurrent neural
network (RNN) with both long short term memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent units (GRU)
is used with RFAL that exploits the time series properties of the I/Q data.
3. Our models have been validated on a laboratory testbed consisting of several universal soft-
ware radio peripheral (USRP) B210s [26] and a RTL-SDR receiver which is also a software
defined radio (SDR) [60]. The USRPs transmitted signals on a particular frequency which
were received by the RTL-SDR. We also collect I/Q data from a SDR made by another
manufacturer, namely ADALM-PLUTO [23]. We show that the I/Q imbalance is more pro-
nounced (and thus easier to exploit both explicitly as well as implicitly) when different types
of SDRs (from different manufacturers) are used as transmitters. We also collect three more
datasets of I/Q values from 8 USRP B210s with varying signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR). We use
distance and multi-path as the defining factors for SNR variation during data-collection.
4. We train the proposed models and present a competitive analysis of the performance of our
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models against the traditional techniques and state-of-the art techniques for transmitter iden-
tification (classification). Results reveal that the proposed methods out-perform the existing
ones thus establishing the superiority and usefulness of the proposed models, more so con-
sidering the fact that the proposed models do not require any pre-processing of the raw I/Q
data that feeds into the NN models.
5. We exploit the temporal properties of I/Q data and propose a supervised learning approach
for transmitter identification using a recurrent network structure. We use two approaches:
first, we exploit only the temporal property, then we exploit the spatio-temporal property. We
propose RNNs with LSTM and GRU cells for the first approach. We propose a convLSTM
model for the latter. Although transmitter fingerprinting has been studied earlier, but to the
best of our knowledge this is the first work which leverages the spatio-temporal property of
the over-the-air signal data.
6. We validate the proposed RNN models using the indoor testbed setup mentioned earlier. The
novelty of our approach lies in accurately modeling and implementing the different types of
RNNs to generate a robust transmitter fingerprinting system from over-the-air signal data,
by exploiting the spatio-temporal correlations within the signal data.
7. We propose a generative adversarial net based solution towards the primary emulation at-
tack. We impersonate SUs using two types of generator models: (a) dumb attacker, and (ii)
smart attacker. The dumb attacker has no “prior" information about the signal characteristics
of the PUs, but still tries to emulate the PUs. However, the smart attackers has sufficient
information about the PU’s signal data and therefore can emulate the PU’s signal in an in-
telligent way. We also model two discriminators (neural networks) and train them over the
PU data, and generated data. The “dumb discriminator” gets generated data from dumb gen-
erator attack model, and “smart discriminator” gets data from smart one. We show that the
GAN training makes the discriminator able to distinguish between a wide array of possible
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malicious entity types and therefore being able to detect the real adversaries with intention
of PUE attack.
8. Using USRP, we collect the raw over-the-air signal data from PUs to train both the discrim-
inators. We also extract the PU’s signal characteristics from the collected data and train
the smart generator. We show that the untrained discriminators have a ∼50% accuracy for
detecting PUE attackers during the deployment phase. We present 100% training accuracy
for both the generator models. The trained discriminators over dumb, and smart generator
models exhibit testing accuracy of 98%, and 99.5% respectively during deployment phase,
with real PUE attackers present.
9. We propose three machine learning based models for long-term prediction of the primary
user’s activity. They are: (i) Linear regression; (ii) Recurrent neural network (RNN) with
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) cells; and (iii) RNN using Convolutional LSTM (ConvL-
STM) cells. Using a testbed, we record transmission activities of 8 software defined radios
(USRP B210) [26], which are used as primary users. A central spectrum sensing module is
trained using the proposed models on the collected dataset for multiple epochs by minimiz-
ing the mean squared error over the training data. The trained models are then used by the
spectrum sensor and used for long-term prediction of the activities of the primary user, to be
used by the secondary users during the deployment phase.
10. We deployed the trained version of all the models in a spectrum sensor and predicted the
shared channel availability for the secondary users with 75%, 97%, and 99% accuracy re-
spectively for linear regression, LSTM, and ConvLSTM. Note that intuitively the ConvL-
STM based model is able to achieve this high accuracy by exploiting the spatio-temporal
correlation present within the recurrent structure of the collected I/Q data. We also show
through testbed evaluation that the proposed models can decrease interference violations by
0.2%, 99.3%, and 100% for linear regression, LSTM and ConvLSTM models, respectively.
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Under-utilizations are decreased by 98.9%, 99.5%, and 100% respectively, for the aforemen-
tioned models.
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related work that is relevant to
this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we propose a rogue transmitter detection technqiue using GAN
based framework in adversarial learning. Chapter 4 presents the machine learning algorithms for
classification of authentic transmitters using recurrent structures of I/Q data. A defense mechanism
against the PUE attack is presented in Chapter 5. The primary user prediction modelling and
testbed implementation is presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we discuss the related works that are most relevant to this dissertation. We di-
vide the discussion into i) transmitter fingerprinting, ii) use of recurrent neural network (RNN)
for transmitter fingerprinting, (iii) existing defense against PUE attacks, and (iv) primary user’s
activity predictions.
2.1 Transmiter Fingerprinting
The problem of transmitter classification has been studied in the past. Here we first discuss a
few traditional learning based approaches for transmitter classification. Finally, we discuss more
recent transmitter identification methods based on the idea of automatic feature detectors (like
neural networks). We also discuss the advantages of using automatic feature learning techniques
over the traditional ones.
2.1.1 Traditional Learning based Techniques
Traditional transmitter classification methods are based on statistical learning techniques that use
expert engineered features which leverage some unique characteristics of the transmitters. In [94],
the authors proposed a genetic algorithm based solution for transmitter classification based on
transients. A transient signal is transmitted when a transmitter is powered up or powered down.
During this short period (typically few micro seconds), capacitive loads charge or discharge. A ge-
netic algorithm generated the “transient times” from 5 different types of transmitters, which were
later classified using a NN model yielding a 85% - 98% accuracy. It is to be emphasized that the
experimental results were solely based on the synthetically generated transient values. Though this
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work used NNs for the final classification, the features (transients) were empirically determined
and hence we categorize this as an example of a traditional approach. A multifractal segmentation
technique was proposed in [86] using the same concept of transients. The segmentation technique
extracted significant features from transient signals and generated a compact multifactral model.
Later a probabilistic NN classifier achieved 92.5% success rate over the extracted transient fea-
tures in a simulated environment. Another transient based transmitter classification was proposed
in [41]. A k-nearest neighbor discriminatory classifier was used to create a classification engine
which leveraged transient signals for spectral feature selection. The authors achieved a 97% accu-
racy at 30 dB SNR and 66% accuracy at 0 dB SNR for classification of 8 transmitters.
A different approach for transmitter fingerprinting was proposed in [101], where the authors clas-
sified FM radio transmitters based on unique stray features extracted from spurious modulation
characteristics. The proposed approach was able to classify samples (20 dB SNR) from 3 FM radio
stations with 62%-71% accuracy. This method does not provide a competitive accuracy and is also
constrained by the need to have knowledge of modulation technique. A particle swarm optimiza-
tion (PSO) technique was proposed in [25], where two radar transmitter models were classified
based on the radar pulse’s time-frequency representation. An acceptable classification accuracy
was reported with 20 dB SNR and relatively low component tolerances. In [106], the authors
proposed a location-based transmitter fingerprinting approach by extracting signal characteristics
(skewness and kurtosis) from wavelet transform. This transmitter location fingerprint was per-
formed for 4 stationary transmitters in an indoor office environment. In [30], the authors proposed
a dimensionality reduction method for extracting intrinsic features from bispectrum information of
transmitters. They reported 99% accuracy for transmitter identification from the bispectrum ma-
trices. However, deployment of such techniques in real-time is challenging due to the additional
overhead for generating the bispectrum before the classifier can be invoked for identification.
As seen from the above discussion, there are some advantages to using traditional fingerprinting
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techniques such as classifying the transmitters based on their unique identifications in that we are
able to leverage the expertise of the “human-in-the-loop” using such techniques through feature
engineering. However, these methods have extra overhead due to the feature extraction step and
furthermore the quality of the solution is constrained by the knowledge of the expert making such
techniques limited in scope. Moreover, as the features are signal and protocol dependent, any
change in the nature of the transmission mandates a change in the underlying model, thus making
them hard to generalize across different types of transmissions (having varying protocols, hetero-
geneous transmitters etc.).
2.1.2 Automatic Feature Learning based Techniques
In recent years, there has been some effort at using automatic feature learning techniques for fin-
gerprinting RF transmitters. In [65] the authors presented a radio modulation classification method
using naively learned features. They have shown that blind temporal learning on densely encoded
time series using CNNs is a viable approach. However, this method did not perform well in the
low signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime. In [92], the authors have presented an unsupervised learn-
ing technique using convolutional autoencoders, to learn the modulation basis functions and then
leverage that to recognize different digital modulation schemes. They also proposed and evaluated
quantitative metrics for evaluating the quality of the encoding using domain relevant performance
metrics.
In [67] the authors have demonstrated the use of NN for modulation detection. Apart from the
results, an interesting aspect of the work is the way I/Q values were used as input to the NN.
More precisely, given N I/Q values, the authors used a vector of size 2N as an input to the NN,
effectively using the I and Q components as a tuple representing a point in the complex plane.
A method for modulation classification was proposed in [73], for a distributed wireless spectrum
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sensing network. The authors used a recurrent neural network using long short term memory
(LSTM) cells yielding 90% accuracy on a synthetic dataset [72].
An in-depth study on the performance of deep learning based radio signal classification was pre-
sented in [68]. The authors considered 24 modulation schemes with a rigorous baseline method
that uses higher order moments and strong boosted gradient tree classification for detection. The
authors also applied their method to real over-the-air data collected by Software Defined Radios
(SDRs). In [66] an approach based on the idea of adversarial learning was proposed for synthe-
sizing new physical layer modulation and coding schemes. The adversarial approach is used to
learn the channel response approximations in any arbitrary communication system, enabling the
design of a smarter channel autoencoder. All these approaches demonstrate the efficacy of using
an “end-to-end” technique based on learning deep feature representations, for different tasks in the
RF domain.
There have been quite a few studies that have used CNN based models for automatic feature learn-
ing [17,55,56,75,85,102,109] for the task of transmitter classification (or identification). The CNN
models presented in [55,75,85] require some pre-processing on the raw signal data before it can be
used as input. In [102], the authors compared several learning paradigms for the task of transmitter
identification. More precisely, they looked at conventional deep neural nets, convolutional neural
nets, support vector machines, and deep neural nets with multi-stage training. They showed that
deep neural nets with multi-stage training worked best for the problem and achieved 100% accu-
racy with a novel dataset having 12 transmitters. On the other hand CNN models were proposed
in [17, 56, 109] for existing datasets (ACARS [4], ADS-B [5], FIT/CorteXlab [53]). However,
none of these models directly take the the raw signal data as input. Note that none of the methods
that we have discussed till now in regards to the task of transmitter identification are resilient to
the presence of active adversaries. This motivated us to propose a robust NN based model which
would be resilient to the presence of active adversaries and at the same time provide an end-to-end
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solution to the transmitter classification problem.
2.1.3 Comparison of Traditional and Deep Learning based Methods
All the traditional techniques that have been used for RF analysis lack flexibility and robustness.
These approaches require an expert’s involvement for determining which features (e.g., transients,
spurious modulation, etc.) to extract and how to design an algorithm tuned to that feature. Even if a
feature is identified, it is not necessary that this feature will be applicable for all scenarios. For ex-
ample, location based fingerprinting [106] will work well for indoor environments but will fail for
non-stationary transmitters. However, deep learning (DL) based methods are capable of learning
the features automatically from the data and hence they do not require the feature engineering step.
Furthermore it is possible to use DL techniques in conjunction with adversarial learning to build
robust transmitter classification models that can function in the presence of active adversaries. In
this work, we use the raw I/Q data as an input to the learning model. The model automatically
discerns the features that can encode the information required to disambiguate the transmitters.
Note that the features computed by the DL system can be implicitly based on the “I/Q imbalance”
or some other intrinsic features of the transmitter or a combination of these.
2.1.4 I/Q Imbalance based Fingerprinting
“I/Q imbalance” based fingerprinting approaches provide more significant discriminant informa-
tion than transient based or modulation-metrics based approaches [37]. Though the use of RF
signal data in general (and I/Q data in particular) with machine learning algorithms has been lim-
ited in the past, more recently there has been several applications (see [57] and references therein).
An “I/Q imbalance” based fingerprinting approach was proposed in [37], where a subclass dis-
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criminant analysis (SDA) ML method was used to estimate the distortion parameters from the I/Q
constellations as features. The proposed method was tested on transmitted signals from 7 Time-
division multiple access (TDMA) satellite terminals, relayed by a transparent transponder, giving
97% accuracy over 15 dB SNR. However, this method is not guaranteed to capture the difference
between transmitter’s “I/Q imbalances,” as it is aggregated by the imbalance of the transpon-
der. Similarly, a classifier based on Gaussian mixture models (GMM) was proposed in [70].
Though, the study showed ∼100% accuracy, the experiments were conducted on artificial data.
A simulation-based transmitter authentication scheme was proposed in [33] using an “I/Q imbal-
ance” matrix and multiple collaborating receivers. After analyzing these existing DL techniques,
it is evident that there is still a lack of systematic “end-to-end” approaches, that can use the raw
signal data from real transmitters and exploit the I/Q imbalance for fingerprinting. It must be noted
that DL-based RF methods will not only exploit the “I/Q imbalances” but also extract and use
other intrinsic features related to the transmitters that may or may not be directly related to I/Q im-
balance. However, the end product will conceptually be able to differentiate between transmitters
having different “I/Q imbalances.”
2.1.5 Consideration of Adversaries
Motivated by the capacity of deep learning systems to automatically learn deep discriminative fea-
tures, we focus on the problem of transmitter identification in the presence of adversaries using
a generative adversarial network (GAN). The idea of training discriminative models via an ad-
versarial process was first proposed by Goodfellow [32]. Since then, GANs have been adopted
for solving problems in varied fields of applications and particularly for image processing where
GANs have proved to be highly efficient for several different tasks [8,22,110]. We take inspiration
from [67] for using the raw I/Q data for input to our networks.
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2.2 Use of RNN for Transmitter Fingerprinting
Recurrent neural networks [31] have been used extensively for modeling temporal data such as
speech [74]. There is limited amount of work that recognizes the potential of using recurrent
structures in the RF domain and in general the use of deep learning in the RF domain has been
limited in the past with only a few applications in recent times [65, 67].
In [62], O’Shea et. al. presented a recurrent neural network that extracted high level protocol
information from the low level physical layer representation for the task of classification. A radio
anomaly detection technique was presented in [64], where the authors used a LSTM based RNN as
a time series predictor using the error component to detect anomaly from real signals. Another ap-
plication of RNN was proposed in [83], where the authors used a deep recurrent neural network to
learn the time-varying probability distribution of received powers on a channel and used the same
to predict the suitability of sharing that channel with other users. A method for modulation clas-
sification was proposed in [73] for a distributed wireless spectrum sensing network. The authors
proposed a recurrent neural network using long short term memory (LSTM) cell, yielding 90% ac-
curacy on a synthetic dataset [72]. Bai et. al. proposed an end-to-end RF fingerprinting [6] method
using two RNNs in order to learn the spatial or temporal pattern. Both simulated and real-world
data was used to improve the positioning accuracy and robustness of moving RF devices.
2.3 Existing Defenses against PUE Attack
In this section we discuss the main premise of PUE attack and its properties. We also present
different ideas for defending against these attacks and finally we discuss the existing research on
these concepts.
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PUE attack, first conceptualized and proposed by Chen et al. [15], is a DoS attack for CRNs. In a
CRN, the PUs are prioritized over any SU. At the heart of a CRN, a spectrum manager makes the
decision of preempting SUs when any PU is in need of transmission. For example, the PUs can be
TV stations with a wide range, wireless microphones with a limited range [16], or mobile public
safety devices surging with sudden transmissions during the times of emergency [14]. The SUs
can be conceptualized as wireless devices connected to a WiFi network.
As per the policies mandated by FCC [27], SUs cannot cause any interference with PU’s transmis-
sion, or hurt the PU’s transmission in any other way. However, the malicious SUs can pretend to
be a PU by “mimicking” certain features of PUs. One example is, where a malicious SU emulates
itself to be a PU by using a low power commercial off-the-shelf TV transmitter [47] located near
some legitimate PUs and starts to transmit on a particular spectrum band. The objective of the
emulated primary user (EPU) could be of two types: (i) a selfish goal to maximize the spectrum
usage for itself, (b) malicious goal with a tendency to prevent the legitimate SUs from detecting
vacant spectrum bands, leading to a DoS attack. The selfish EPU attacker starts transmitting on a
vacant frequency band without going into the waiting queue for SU selection by the central spec-
trum allocator. The malicious EPU attacker starts to “attack” over multiple vacant frequency bands
randomly, resulting in starvation of PUs’ and legitimate SUs.
Any security threat can be thwarted by several defense mechanisms through continuous research.
Though there is still a dearth of opportunities to come up with a robust defense mechanism to over-
come all technical challenges related to PUE attacks, there are few existing defense mechanisms
which are available today. One such technique is matched filtering-based detection [13] of PUE
attacker, which requires specialized hardware and software. On the other hand, energy detection-
based schemes [61] poises high risk of missed false alarm and missed detection possibility. The
location-based detection technique [15] is limited to stationary PUs with known coordinates. An-
other approach was the use of phase noise as a signature [105] to identify PUs and defend against
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PUE attacks. The key idea behind this technique is to erase modulation from captured signal
(which is modulated) and extract phase noise of local oscillator (LO) to work as a signature. This
approach is also constrained over the prior knowledge of modulation scheme. However, the use
of a cryptographic signature and wireless link signature [50] to detect PUE attacker requires an
additional helper node in close physical proximity of each PU. Similarly, a cyclostationary calcu-
lation [71] based artificial neural network model needs prior knowledge of modulation schemes of
PUs, and it is constrained to be different for the other users.
All the mentioned defense mechanisms are burdened with overheads or constraints of different
types. To resolve this, we propose a GAN based robust PUE attack defense (in Chapter 5) which
will involve only centralized deployment and can provide defense mechanism for both mobile and
stationary PUs or legitimate SUs, without any such constraints.
2.4 Primary User’s Activity Prediction
In this section, we discuss some previous important work in this area of primary user’s activity
prediction modeling that have used machine learning techniques. Various traditional methods of
spectrum sensing and their applications have been presented in [103]. The idea of cooperative
spectrum sensing was presented as the solution to security related problems in the spectrum sensing
domain. Though the concept of estimating spectrum usage in multiple dimensions such as time,
frequency and space, was introduced, no prediction attempts were made. In [91], the authors
presented opportunistic spectrum access based on a Markovian model that accounted for the bursty
nature of ON/OFF traffic models. Through empirical results, the authors have shown that the
selection of a channel for the secondary user will depend on the probability distribution of the
primary user’s traffic as well the elapsed OFF time. This dissertation established the feasibility of
using PU usage modeling for designing the spectrum access methods for SU bursty traffic.
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There are few existing researches on spectrum sensing and prediction that use machine learning
based techniques. An artificial neural network based approach for spectrum sensing in noisy envi-
ronment was proposed in [93]. The simulation results accomplished better sensing reliability than
traditional techniques for signals with low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). A machine learning based
spectrum prediction approach was proposed in [96]. A multi-layer perception (MLP) based neural
network was used to predict the primary user’s activity, the resulting model was validated through
extensive simulations.
In [100], the authors give an analytical overview of various existing methods for spectrum predic-
tion, that are based on: moving average, autoregressive models, hidden Markov models, Bayesian
interference and static neighbor graph. It was established that all these models have limited scope
for accurate long-term prediction. A deep cooperative sensing scheme was proposed by Lee et
al. in [46]. A convolutional neural network (CNN) model was proposed to exploit both spectral
and spatial correlation of individual sensing outcomes for multiple PUs and SUs. All these studies
demonstrate the necessity of a practical long-term spectrum usage prediction method for the PUs
that leverage machine learning techniques.
Our focus is on the effectiveness of recurrent neural networks [31] which have been used exten-
sively for modeling temporal data such as speech [74]. There is limited amount of work that
recognizes the potential of using recurrent structures in the Radio frequency (RF) domain. Though
such use of I/Q data for building machine learning systems for communication has been limited
in the past, recently it has been used in several applications [57, 65, 67, 79]. RF data (being a time
series data) has both spatial and temporal property within the I/Q components. However, to the
best of our knowledge there is no recurrent neural network based application which exploits both
the spatial and temporal property of the RF data and use that for a long-term prediction model for
PU’s presence or absence.
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CHAPTER 3: ADVERSARIAL LEARNING AND DETECTION
In this chapter we propose the Radio Frequency Adversarial Learning (RFAL) framework for build-
ing a robust system to identify rogue RF transmitters by designing and implementing a generative
adversarial net (GAN). We first demonstrate the use of generative adversarial nets (GAN) to dis-
ambiguate trusted transmitters from rogue (fake) ones. After eliminating the rogue transmitters,
we use different standard neural network (NN) models to identify (classify) the trusted transmitters
based on their radio fingerprints.
We program 8 universal software radio peripheral (USRP) software defined radios (SDRs) as
trusted transmitters and collect “over-the-air” raw I/Q data from them using a Realtek Software
Defined Radio (RTL-SDR), in a laboratory setting. We also implement a discriminator model that
discriminates between the trusted transmitters and the counterfeit ones with 99.9% accuracy and
is trained in the GAN framework using data from the generator. Finally, after elimination of the
adversarial transmitters, the trusted transmitters are classified using a convolutional neural network
(CNN), a fully connected deep neural network (DNN) and a recurrent neural network (RNN) to
demonstrate building of an end-to-end robust transmitter identification system with RFAL. Exper-
imental results reveal that the CNN, DNN, and RNN are able to correctly distinguish between the
8 trusted transmitters with 81.6%, 94.6% and 97% accuracy respectively. We also show that better
“trusted transmission” classification accuracy is achieved for all three types of neural networks
when data from two different types of transmitters (different manufacturers) are used rather than
when using the same type of transmitter (same manufacturer).
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 presents some background on feature selection for
the proposing RFAL. The GAN architecture along with the generator and the discriminator models
are proposed in Section 3.2. The various NN models used are discussed in Section 3.3. We present
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the testbed setup and evaluation framework in Section 3.4. The results are presented in Section 3.5.
The contents of this chapter appeared in [76, 77, 79].
3.1 Feature Selection
In order for ML techniques to be effective for the task of emitter identification, one must choose an
attribute or feature that is unique to a transmitter, irrespective of the signals it transmits. A feature
that is commonly used for this task is the “I/Q imbalance” that is generated by the random noise
introduced into the transmitter manufacturing process due to the use of uncharacterized mixers,
oscillators and unbalanced low pass filters [97]. However, building robust learning systems using
traditional methods that only uses the “I/Q imbalance” is hard due to the underlying characteristics
of the RF channel. This when coupled with the presence of active adversaries, renders the use of
traditional learning algorithms in RF channels moot.
3.1.1 I/Q Imbalance
The low price of radio devices comes with a trade-off; namely the presence of “almost unde-
tectable” hardware impairments in the radio units due to the use of inexpensive bulk produced
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components during manufacturing. One such impairment is the
imbalance between the in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) components of the transmitted signal, com-
monly known as the “I/Q imbalance,” that is unique to different radio hardware and are caused by
imperfections in local oscillators and mixers. As a result of this, the I and Q components of the
modulator are not orthogonal. When a signal is transmitted using a particular radio transmitter
having an I/Q imbalance, this is imposed over the complex-valued I/Q data that is being transmit-
ted [44], as shown in Fig. 3.1. The presence of I/Q imbalance leads to performance degradation
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for higher order modulations because the symbol rotation becomes more sensitive with increasing


































Figure 3.1: I/Q Imbalance for QPSK: (a) Before (b) After 45° Phase Imbalance
The number of resources having information about the I/Q imbalance of real systems is limited.
Some prior works [3, 7, 12, 20, 36, 49, 95] on I/Q imbalance estimation and compensation have
reported amplitude imbalance test values ranging from 0.02 to 0.82 and phase imbalance test values
between 2° and 11.42° [44]. These estimates can in turn be used to compensate for the imbalance.
The in-phase and quadrature component of baseband signal is generated from RF signal for signal
processing convenience. Ideally, I and Q baseband signals should be orthogonal to each other with
same amplitude. However, different channel environment and transmitters configuration poise
various numbers of imbalances, e.g. magnitude imbalance, phase imbalance, quadrature offset,
inphase offset, DC offset, in the transmitted signal.
Therefore, the transmitted signal, along with different imbalances and impairment from the trans-
mitter radio, can be written as following:
I ′(t) = α cos(ωt) + βI (3.1)
Q′(t) = sin(ωt+ ψ) + βQ (3.2)
34
where βI and βQ are DC offsets on two baseband component, α and ψ represent amplitude and
phase imbalance respectively.
In spite of these techniques for compensation of the imbalance, the fact remains that all transceivers
exhibit this unique I/Q imbalance. Furthermore, the I/Q imbalance depends on the choice of the
hardware components used, and is an unwanted byproduct of the manufacturing process that is
hard to imitate. Hence the I/Q imbalance can be used as a basis for feature engineering (implicit
or otherwise) for transmitter identification and recognition.
3.2 GAN for Rogue Transmitter Detection
As pointed out earlier, most of the traditional ML techniques are susceptible to malicious attacks.
The susceptibility increases once the attacker knows the features used by the learning algorithm.
With the knowledge of the feature space (and hence the underlying feature distribution) the attacker
becomes smart enough to mislead the learning process. Thus, for the problem of transmitter iden-
tification, the target of the adversaries would be to learn the probability distribution of the training
data used for model creation, given a sample of the same. With this knowledge, the adversaries
can use a generative model to generate signals so as to spoof the transmission of known transmit-
ters. A GAN [32] uses a generative model which enables the realistic creation of samples from a
given distribution which can then be used to train a discriminator for identifying real samples from
false/counterfeited ones obtained from the generator. The GAN training makes the model resilient
over the trained adversarial data and thus intuitively helps it to be prepared for the “yet-to-be-seen”
adversaries.
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3.2.1 Proposed GAN Architecture
The proposed GAN framework, as shown in Fig. 3.2, has two primary components: a generative
model (G) that generates false data using a given data distribution and a discriminative model (D)
that estimates the probability that a sample came from the training data (that is known transmitters)
rather than G. The adversary generates random modulation scheme (m(t)), signal amplitude (r(t))
and phase (l(t)) and mixes additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) (n(t)) with the false signal.
The generated signal (g(t)) which is initially random in nature improves over time as the generator
learns from the discriminator and improves on its ability to imitate real data. On the other hand, the
discriminator (D) gets input from both the generator (G) and Trusted transmitters. This helps it
to learn to differentiate between real and false inputs. The known transmitter data is collected and































Figure 3.2: Proposed RFAL GAN architecture
Overall, our objective is to train G in such a way that will maximize the probability of D making a
mistake. G tunes its hyper parameters with the feedback fromD. We argue that GAN is an efficient
36
way to generate correlated data samples and thereby approximate an accurate generative model,
something the adversary aims to achieve. Once the model is trained, RFAL synthesizes signals
using the generator to mimic adversarial transmitters based on the learned probability distribution
























































































































Figure 3.4: GAN Implementation for Rogue Transmitter Detection
3.2.2 The Generative Model
In order to build the generator, we treat the overall problem as an N -class decision problem where
the input is a complex base-band time series representation of the received signal. That is, the
training data consists of the in-phase and quadrature components of a radio signal obtained at
discrete time intervals through analog to digital conversion with a carrier frequency to obtain a
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1×N complex valued vector. Classically, this is written as:
s(t) = c1m(t) + c2r(t) + c3l(t) (3.3)
where s(t) is a continuous time series signal modulated onto a sinusoid with either varying fre-
quency, phase, amplitude, trajectory, or some permutation of these parameters. Here, m(t), r(t),
and l(t) are the time series continuous signals for modulation, amplitude, and phase respectively,
selected randomly by the generator. The coefficients c1, c2, and c3 are some path loss or constant
gain terms associated with m(t), r(t), and l(t) respectively. The output g(t) is obtained as:
g(t) = s(t) + n(t) (3.4)
where n(t) is the AWGN. The output g(t) is then fed to a generator which is used as an un-
supervised learning tool as a part of the GAN framework. The generator learns the probability
distribution pg(x) over sample space (x) of the I/Q input.
3.2.3 The Discriminative Model
The discriminative model learns by minimizing a cost function during training. The cost function,
C(G;D), depends on both the generator (G) and the discriminator (D). It is formulated as C(G;D)
= Epdata(x) logD(x) + Epg(x) log(1 − D(x)), where pg(x) is the generator’s distribution over x,
pdata(x) is the data distribution over x, D(x) is the probability that x came from pdata(x) than







For the GAN framework, there is an unique optimal discriminator for a fixed generator, D∗(x) =
pdata(x)
pdata(x) + pg(x)
[32]. It is also inferred that G is optimal when pg(x) = pdata(x), i.e., the gener-
ator is optimal when the discriminator cannot distinguish real samples from false ones. Similarly,
the D is optimal when the discriminator can recognize each real sample from the false ones.
3.2.4 GAN Implementation
For implementing the GAN, we use “over-the-air” signal data collected from the trusted transmit-
ters. (The testbed setup is discussed in Section 3.4.) The generator (G) generates counterfeit data
from the same sample space to impersonate a trusted transmitter. True and counterfeit I/Q data
are fed to the discriminator (D) with equal probability. We design the discriminator and generator
separately, as shown in Fig. 3.3. The overall GAN implementation is shown in Fig. 3.4.
The generator starts by generating random data within (−∞,+∞). As the training evolves, the
generator learns that the sample space of real data is [−1, 1]. Thus, the generator will gradually
generate I/Q values within [−1, 1] in turn reducing the parameter space. The time-invariant features
being automatically learned by the discriminator should implicitly capture the inherent imbalance
within the I/Q data. The generator gradually learns the real data distribution over multiple training
epochs and starts to replicate the I/Q imbalances in the generated I/Q values.
Once the initial random values are generated, they are passed through two dense layers of size 512
and 1024 respectively with tanh [11] activation. Then a single dense layer of twice the sample size
(2048 in our case) is invoked with the sigmoid activation function [11]. G continues to learn the
data distribution (pg) and generates counterfeit samples of size 2048 within the sample space of
the I/Q values.
D consists of one input layer of 2048 nodes, two hidden layers of 1024 and 512 nodes respectively,
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and finally a softmax output layer of 2 nodes to classify an input as either Counterfeited or
Trusted. We used tanh as activation function at the hidden layers and added Dropout [89] of 0.5
in between these layers for regularization. We train both the generator and discriminator through
iterative sequential learning to strengthen the generative model over time.
Once the discriminator recognizes the trusted transmitters from the counterfeit ones, we feed the
trusted transmitter data into another DNN (either convolutional or fully connected (dense)) for
further classification into a number of classes (as determined by the number of trusted transmitters).
Next we discuss the NN architectures we use for this purpose.
3.3 Proposed Neural Networks for Transmitter Classification
Recent advances in NNs have made it possible to obtain robust models with low generalization
errors by training “deep” neural architectures efficiently. The “depth” signifies the number of iter-
ative operations performed on the input data using each layer’s transfer function and deeper archi-
tectures allow the network to learn more robust feature representations from the input data. Though
such techniques require higher computation power and involve complicated layer-by-layer back-
propagation, nevertheless, most DL systems are able to efficiently learn deep feature represen-
tations from the training data using back-propagation and some variation of gradient decent, with
adaptive learning rates (e.g., Adam [42]) and regularization to avoid overfitting (e.g., Dropout [89]).
Next, we present our proposed NN models for classification of Trusted transmitters. We use a
total of 8 transmitters, the details of which are given in Section 3.4.
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3.3.1 CNN Model
In order to capture the correlation between I/Q values, we started by implementing a convolutional
neural network (CNN). We implement the CNN with three conv2D layers with 1024, 512 and 256
filters respectively, a Flatten operation and three fully connected (FC) layers of size 512, 256 and
8 nodes [18] respectively, as shown in Fig. 3.5. We use Dropout [89] of 0.25 and 0.5 after each
conv2D and dense layer respectively. We also use kernel size of (2,3) and stride of (2,2) at each
of the Conv2D layers. We apply a pooling layer MaxPooling2D after each conv2D layer with
pool size of (2,2) and stride of (2,2). We use ReLU [58] activation for all convolution and fully
connected layers, other than the last, where we use softmax. Note that, the number of nodes in
the last layer is changed based on the number of classes the dataset has. We use Adam [42] (with
learning rate of 10−3) based optimization with categorical cross-entropy training.
It is to be noted that we design the CNN with only 3 convolution layers and 4 fully connected
layers for faster training [34], since no significant increase in the testing accuracy was observed


















































Figure 3.5: CNN Implementation for Transmitter Classification
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3.3.2 DNN Model
Apart from the CNN discussed above, we also use a fully connected (dense) DNN for the task of
trusted transmitter classification. The implementation of the DNN is similar to the discriminator
model of GAN and is shown in Fig. 3.6. The only difference is that the softmax output layer has
8 nodes to recognize the 8 transmitters (or more generally k nodes if there are k transmitters). We
implement a DNN with 5-layers with 1 input layer and 4 dense layers. We use tanh [11] activation
function for the Dense layers in this model. We apply biases and regularization to avoid under-




























































Figure 3.6: DNN Implementation for Transmitter Classification
3.3.3 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
In order to exploit the the time-series property of the collected data, we use RNNs with LSTM
and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) cells, as both avoid the “vanishing” or the “exploding” gradient
problems [24].
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3.3.3.1 Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) Cell Model
Though LSTM cells can be modeled and designed in various ways depending on the need, we
implement the cells as shown in Fig. 3.7. In each LSTM cell, there are (i) three types of gates:
input (i), forget (f ) and output (o); and (ii) a state update of internal cell memory. The most
interesting part of the LSTM cell is the “forget” gate, which at time t is denoted by ft. The forget
gates decide whether to keep a cell state memory (ct) or not. The forget gates are designed as per
the equation (3.6) on the input value of xt at time t and output (ht−1) at time (t− 1).
ft = σ(Wxfxt +Whfht−1 + bf ) (3.6)
where, σ denotes the sigmoid activation function, Wxf and bf represent the associated weight
and bias respectively, between the input (x) and the forget gate (f ). Once ft determines which
memories to forget, the input gates (it) decide which cell states (c̃t) to update as per equations (3.7)
and (3.8).
it = σ(Wxixt +Whiht−1 + bi) (3.7)
c̃t = tanh(Wxcxt +Whcht−1 + bct−1) (3.8)
In equation (3.9), the old cell state (ct−1) is updated to the new cell state (ct) using forget gates (ft)
and input gates (it):
ct = ft ◦ ct−1 + it ◦ c̃t (3.9)
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where, ◦ is the Hadamard product. Finally, RFAL filters the output values through output gates
(ot) based on the cell states (ct) as per equations (3.10) and (3.11).
ot = σ(Wxoxt +Whoht + bo) (3.10)














sum over all elements
Figure 3.7: LSTM Cell Architecture Used in the RNN Model
We design and implement a RNN with LSTM, the structure of which is shown in Fig. 3.8. We use 2
LSTM layers with 1024 and 256 units sequentially. Next we add 2 fully connected layers with 512
and 256 nodes respectively. We use batch normalization on the output and pass it through a dense
layer of 8 nodes. We use ReLU [58] as activation function for the LSTM layers and tanh [11]
as activation for the dense layers. Lastly, we use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [11] (with












































































Figure 3.8: RNN Implementation for Transmitter Classification
3.3.3.2 Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) Model
The main drawback of using LSTM cells is the need for additional memory. GRUs [19] have one
less gate than LSTMs for the same purpose, thus having a reduced memory and CPU footprint.
The GRU cells control the flow of information just like the LSTM cells, but without the need for a
memory unit. It just exposes the full hidden content without any control. It has a “reset gate” (zt),
an “update gate” (rt), and a cell state memory (ct) as shown in Fig. 3.9. The reset gates determine
whether to combine the new input with a cell state memory (ct) or not. The update gate decides
how much of ct to retain. The equations (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), and (3.15) related to different gates
and states of GRU are given below.
zt = σ(Wxzxt +Whzht−1 + bz) (3.12)
rt = σ(Wxrxt +Whrht−1 + br) (3.13)
ct = tanh(Wxcxt +Whc(rt ◦ ht−1)) (3.14)
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Figure 3.9: GRU Cell Architecture Used in the RNN Model
We implemented the recurrent model with GRU cells and used the same architecture as the LSTM
implementation (GRU cells instead of LSTM cells at the first two layers). The proposed GRU
network needs fewer parameters than the LSTM model. In this case, we also use SGD [11] based
optimizer with a learning rate of 10−3. An quantitative comparison of the results is discussed in
Section 3.5.6.
3.4 Testbed Setup and Evaluation
In order to validate the proposed models, we wanted to use our own “over-the-air” RF data col-
lected from different transmitters, instead of synthetic or publicly available data. We implemented
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the generator and discriminator (of the GAN) to detect an unknown (adversarial) transmitter and
then used the NN models to classify the known ones, the details of which are discussed next.
3.4.1 Signal Generation and Data Collection
In order to learn the discriminating fingerprints (features) of similar transmitters, we used 8 uni-
versal software radio peripheral (USRP) radios of the same kind, namely B210 from Ettus Re-
search [26]. The overall setup for signal generation and reception is shown in Fig. 3.10. The
B210s were programmed to transmit random data on 904 MHz using Quadrature Phase Shift Key-
ing (QPSK) modulation. We used GNURadio [29] for signal processing and data transmission.
The flow graph is presented in Fig. 3.11. The modulated signal was transmitted through the USRP
sink block. For the receiver, we used a RTL-SDR [60] which captured “over-the-air” raw I/Q data
and wrote it onto a file.
3.4.2 Analysis of Data Collection Environment
We set up the data collection testbed in an indoor lab environment with a direct line of sight be-
tween the transmitter and the receiver with a distance of 10 ft. Thus, the underlying channel can
be modeled as a Rician fading channel. There was also multi-path effects due to the reflections
from the walls. We measured the signal to noise ratio (SNR) using a RTL-SDR [60] dongle and
Spekrtum [69] which is an open source spectrum analyzer available for both Windows and Linux.
We decided to calibrate the SNR using the Spekrtum software (rather than using a spectrum an-
alyzer) due to cost and portability issues. We found that the noise floor in the lab was between
-20 dB and -30 dB. The signal strength for the 200 KHz (from 903.9 MHz to 904.1 MHz) channel
was between 0 dB and 10 dB. We set the transmitter gain to 45 dB and calculated the SNR as the
difference between the noise floor and the signal strength. Our calculated SNR was 5 dB - (-25 dB)
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= 30 dB, with a 45 dB transmitter gain. It is to be noted that the signal strengths (in dB) of noise
and signal measured by the Spektrum is relative, but the difference between them is absolute.
We also collected data for different SNR values by varying the transmitter-receiver distance and
hindering the line-of-sight in the laboratory. As mentioned earlier, we obtained a SNR of 30 dB
by keeping the transmitter and receiver at 10 feet from each other. Similarly we collect 3 more
datasets with SNR of 20 dB, 10 dB and 0 dB at 20 feet, 30 feet, and 45 feet respectively. It is to be















Signal Processing and Data Collection
Figure 3.10: Signal Generation and Data Collection Setup
3.4.3 I/Q Datasets
We collected raw I/Q signal data with a sample size of 1024, i.e., each sample consists of 1024
I and 1024 Q values. The choice of 1024 as the sample size was sufficient to capture the unique
pattern of I/Q imbalances and at the same time it was not computationally expensive. We experi-
mented with other sample sizes as well: smaller sample size yields degraded performance whereas
larger sample size does not improve the accuracy. We collected 40,000 training samples from each
transmitter to avoid the data skewness problem observed in ML. The configuration parameters used
are given in Table 3.1. We collected two different datasets at 30 dB SNR and three datasets with
three different SNRs, as discussed below.
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Figure 3.11: GNU Radio Flow Graph for Data Collection for USRPs
Table 3.1: Transmission Configuration Parameters
Parameters Values
Transmitter Gain 45 dB




# Transmitters 2 to 8
3.4.3.1 Homogeneous Dataset
For the “homogeneous” dataset, we use only one type of radio, namely, the USRP B210 from Ettus
Research. We collected two sets of data: (i) using 4 USRP B210 transmitters: 6.8 GB size, 160K
rows and 2048 columns and (ii) using 8 USRP B210 transmitters: 13.45 GB size, 320K rows and
2048 columns. Note that the SNR was 30 db.
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3.4.3.2 Heterogeneous Dataset
In order to investigate the performance of the proposed classification methods, when different types
of transmitters (from different manufacturers) are present, we use PLUTO SDR [23] apart from
the B210s when collecting the data. The GNURadio flow graph for signal generation is similar to
Fig. 3.11 with a different sink block for the PLUTO SDR. Note that the SNR in this case was also
30 db. The ‘heterogeneous’ datasets were obtained using (i) 2 USRP transmitters: 3.31 GB size,
80K rows and 2048 columns and (ii) 1 USRP B210 and 1 PLUTO transmitter: 2.85 GB size, 80K
rows and 2048 columns.
3.4.3.3 Varying SNR Datasets
We collected 3 more datasets with 8 USRP B210 transmitters and SNRs of 20 dB, 10 dB, and 0
dB respectively. Each dataset is of size ∼13 GB with 320K rows and 2048 columns.
3.4.4 Correlation in Dataset
Correlation between each data sample plays a crucial role in transmitter classification. Given T
training samples (for T timestamps) and a sample size of M for each time stamp, where each
sample is a vector (I,Q) ∈ C representing a number in the complex plane, we create a new vector
X(t) = [Ii, Qi; i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ]t ∈ C2M ; t = 1, 2, · · · , T for timestamp t, and use it as an input
to the NN. As mentioned before in our case (M = 1024). Thus we represent the I and Q values
of each training sample at timestamp (t) as: [I0Q0I1Q1I2Q2I3Q3I4Q4 · · · I1023Q1023]t. We used
QPSK modulation [88] , which generates a constellation plot like Fig. 3.1. This signifies that the
correlation should be between every fourth value, i.e., between I0 and I4, andQ0 andQ4 and so on.
Hence we calculate the correlation coefficient of between I0I1I2I3, I4I5I6I7 and similarly, between
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Q0Q1Q2Q3 and Q4Q5Q6Q7 and so on. We take the average of all the correlation coefficients for
each sample.
We use numpy.corrcoef for this purpose which uses Pearson product-moment correlation coeffi-



















Ii and similarly for the Q values.
The correlations for all the 40,000 samples for each transmitter are shown in Fig. 3.12. We ob-
served that around 75% of the samples’ correlation coefficients are between −0.1 and 0.1 and
the remaining 25% are close to 0.9. However, for transmitter ID 3, all the samples’ correlation
coefficients are between −0.1 and 0.1. This behavior of transmitter ID 3 is an obvious example
of manufacturing differences. However, this observation gives us intuition about the difficulty of
CNN with 2D convolutions for the task of transmitter classification. CNNs capture the correla-
tion (local features) in the data. However, in this case, as the nature of the correlations are the same
for all but one transmitter, hence there is not enough discriminative information in the correlations
to disambiguate between all the transmitters, thus leading to the conclusion that CNNs with sim-
ple two dimensional convolutions will not be effective for the classification task. This was later
corroborated via our testbed implementation (Section 3.5).
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(a) Trans ID 1 (b) Trans ID 2
(c) Trans ID 3 (d) Trans ID 4
(e) Trans ID 5 (f) Trans ID 6
(g) Trans ID 7 (h) Trans ID 8
Figure 3.12: Correlation Plot for Different Transmitters in the Collected Dataset
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3.4.5 Machine Learning Libraries Used
There are several libraries and tools that implement learning frameworks with support for im-
mensely concurrent GPU architectures, that reduce the burden of programming the traditional
GPU routines for training of larger NNs. We use Keras [18] as the frontend with Tensorflow [1] as
the backend. Keras is an overlay on neural network primitives with Tensorflow [1] or Theano [2]
that provides a customizable interface for quick deployment of complex NNs. We also use Numpy,
Scipy, and Matplotlib Python libraries.
3.4.6 Performance Metric
To measure the effectiveness of any NN architecture, “classification accuracy” is used as the typ-
ical performance metric. However, “classification accuracy” as it is defined can sometimes be
misleading and incomplete when the data is skewed. A confusion matrix overcomes this problem
by showing how the classification model performs when it comes to erroneous detections (false
alarms), and correct “counterfeit” classifications. It provides more insights on the performance by
identifying not only the number of errors, but more importantly the types of errors. As a result we
use confusion matrices to display and analyze the results of our experiments.
3.5 Implementation Results and Discussions
In this section, we present the results of i) adversarial transmitter detection using GAN and ii)
transmitter classification using different NN architectures. We conducted the experiments on a
Ryzen 8 Core system with 64 GB RAM and a GTX 1080 Ti GPU unit with 11 GB memory. For
the sake of being robust and statistically significant, we present the experimental results for each
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model after several runs of each implementation. We focused on four main aspects:
• Implementing a GAN to distinguish adversarial transmitters from trusted ones.
• Implementing a CNN with 2D convolutions to exploit the correlation in collected signal data
of the trusted transmitters for trusted transmitter identification.
• Implementing a DNN to classify the trusted transmitters.
• Implementing RNN with both LSTM and GRU cells to improve the accuracy of trusted
transmitter classification by exploiting the temporal aspect of the signal data.
3.5.1 GAN Results
In order to detect the adversarial transmitters, we implemented a GAN based model as described
in Section 3.2.4. We used categorical cross-entropy training and Adam [42] for gradient based
optimization. We notice that the discriminator was able to detect the adversarial transmitters with
50% accuracy before the GAN based training. Once the GAN goes through several epochs (<
50) of adversarial training, the optimal discriminator (D∗) is able to detect the Counterfeit
transmissions with about 99.9% accuracy as shown by the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve and confusion matrix in Fig. 3.13. Note that one epoch consists of a forward pass and a
backward pass through the GAN over the entire dataset. It is clear from the confusion matrix
that the number of false negatives and false positives are very low and well within an acceptable
range [11]. The testing accuracy of the GAN implementation on datasets with different SNRs is
presented in Table 3.2 . The “parameters” represent the total number of hyper-parameters required
for the respective model.
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Table 3.2: Accuracy of GAN for 4 and 8 Transmitters
Dataset SNR #Trans #Parameters Acc (%)
3.6 M (G)
6.8 GB 30 4 6.8 M (D) 99.9
10.4 M (GAN)
3.6 M (G)
13.45 GB 30 8 6.8 M (D) 99.9
10.4 M (GAN)
3.6 M (G)
13.45 GB 0 8 6.8 M (D) 99.9
10.4 M (GAN)
(a) ROC Curve (b) Confusion Matrix
Figure 3.13: ROC Curve and Confusion Matrix of Counterfeit Transmitter Detection from RFAL
In Fig. 3.14, we present three plots to represent how the proposed generator behaves. Note that we
first show the plots using randomly selected 128 samples from both the real and generated datasets.
We choose the number 128 as it is also used as the batch size for the training. In Fig. 3.14(b), we see
that the data generated before the GAN training does not represent the distribution of the real data
as shown in Fig. 3.14(a). It is evident that initially the I/Q values are randomly generated between
0 and 1. However, once the generator is trained over multiple iterations, it starts generating more
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realistic data as shown in Fig. 3.14(b) which shows that the distribution of the generated data
is starting to resemble the real data shown in Fig. 3.14(a). Once the GAN training converges,
the generator has learned the data distribution of the I/Q values from the known transmitters and
hence it starts to generate counterfeit data that succinctly captures the actual distribution of the I/Q
values. Thus now the generated I/Q values are distributed within the range of [-1,1] as is the case
with the real data. Figure 3.15 shows the plots for the real data and the generated data after full
GAN training. These images are obtained by plotting 2000 I/Q samples. Also we do not discuss
the theory of why the generator is able to generate realistic data because though there is some idea
in the research community as to why GANs work, it is not fully understood yet. Furthermore,
since this is a more applied work we refrain from adding such theory into the dissertation. Rather
we provide references which interested readers may consult to learn more about the GANs.
(a) Real Data (b) Generated Data before
GAN Training
(c) Generated Data after GAN
Training
Figure 3.14: Output from the Proposed Generator (Plot for 128 samples)
Note that though this chapter is not about trusted transmitter classification (but rather about using
adversarial learning using GANs for identifying rogue transmitters), we decided to explore the
capability of systems based on neural networks for the task of trusted transmitter classification as
well. Next we present the results of this endeavor.
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(a) Real Data (b) Generated Data after Full
GAN Training
Figure 3.15: Final Output from the Proposed Generator (2000 samples)
3.5.2 CNN Results
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.16: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using CNN
Once the rogue transmitters are detected and eliminated, our system classifies the “trusted” trans-
mitters using a neural network. First we used a CNN built according to the implementation details
provided in Section 3.3.1 for trusted transmitter classification. We obtain 89.07% and 81.6% accu-
racy for 4 and 8 transmitter classifications respectively. The accuracy plots and confusion matrices
for both the cases are presented in Figs. 3.16 and 3.17. We note that both the training and validation
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accuracy increases with the number of epochs. However for our CNN implementation the number
of false positives and false negatives are somewhat high. Intuitively, this shows that the convolu-
tional filters that were used with the network were not able to identify and encode discriminative
features for this task. Since we know that there is at least one discriminative characteristic that
distinguishes between the transmitters (namely the I/Q imbalance), we conclude that the input rep-
resentation that we used with the CNN did not effectively encode these characteristics and hence
the system could not efficiently learn them.
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.17: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using CNN
In order to understand the inner workings of the CNN better, we present the feature maps obtained
from the first convolution layer of the CNN, for the case of four transmitter classification, in Fig.
3.18. It can be seen that each of these feature maps encodes a different pattern, one for each of
the four different transmitters. However, we also notice that the convolutions fail to capture the
highly discriminative patterns from the I/Q data. Thus for example, none of the feature maps
resemble feature characteristic of the data shown in 3.15(a). Thus even though the features are
different for each transmitter, they do not fully encode discriminative features present in the I/Q
samples. Intuitively this is because of the fact that the I/Q samples does not have significant spatial
correlation that can be leveraged through the use of the convolution operation. Since further tuning
of the CNN parameters was unsuccessful, we decided to build a fully connect DNN to try and
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Figure 3.18: Feature Maps for the First Convolution Layer of the Proposed CNN Model
3.5.3 DNN Results
To overcome the deficiencies of the CNN, we use a DNN as described in Section 3.3.2. The DNN
yields an accuracy of 96.49% for 4 transmitters and 94.60% for 8 transmitters. The accuracy
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plots and confusion matrices are shown in Figs. 3.19 and 3.20 respectively. It is evident that the
number of false positives and false negatives in the confusion matrices are significantly low for the
DNN as compared to the CNN and thus intuitively the DNN can capture and learn better features
from the I/Q samples than the CNN for the task of transmitter classification. Note that from the
perspective of the features learned by the DNN, it is hard to explain the types of features that are
learned by these systems. However since the task of classification boils down to learning a decision
boundary and recently it has been shown that DNNs are capable of learning approximations of such
boundaries efficiently [48], the possible reason for the better performance of the DNN might be tied
to learning a better approximation to the underlying function representing the decision boundary
for this task.
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.19: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using DNN
3.5.4 RNN (with LSTM Cells) Results
For the RNN, we first implement the LSTM cells as described in Section 3.3.3.1. We achieved
97.40% and 95.78% testing accuracy for 4 and 8 transmitters respectively. The accuracy plots and
confusion matrices are given in Figs. 3.21 and 3.22 respectively.
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(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.20: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using DNN
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.21: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using LSTM Cells
3.5.5 RNN (with GRU Cells) Results
Finally, we implement RNN with GRU cells as described in Section 3.3.3.2. We achieved 97.85%
and 97.06% testing accuracy for 4 and 8 transmitters respectively. The accuracy plots and con-
fusion matrices are shown in Figs. 3.23 and 3.24 respectively. It must be noted that the GRU
implementation achieves better accuracy than the one using LSTM cells.
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(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.22: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using LSTM Cells
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.23: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using GRU Cells
During the training phase, the hyper-parameters get adjusted depending on the categorical cross-
entropy loss. Sometimes, with such adjustments, the model tends to over-fit the training data.
To avoid such scenarios, we used Dropout [89] regularization in our models. Another way to
monitor and possibly avoid over-fitting is through the use of cross validation during the training
phase. This way, we ensure that the proposed model gets trained fairly so that it generalizes well
during the testing phase. Note that the fluctuations in the validation curve show that for certain
epochs with a particular set of hyper-parameter values, the model tends to over-fit the data, but in
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later epochs the hyper-parameter values get adjusted so as to counter the effect of the overfitting.
Furthermore, the training can be tweaked using the results of the validation phase. Note that
since the I/Q samples represent a time series data, it is natural to model them using a RNN. Since
RNNs learn the temporal correlation between the time series data, they can encode the transmitter
specific variations in the I/Q data and intuitively this makes the RNNs better at the task of trusted
transmitter classification than the CNNs.
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 3.24: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using GRU Cells
3.5.6 Classification Comparison of CNN/DNN/RNN
Once a transmitter is found to be Trusted via the proposed GAN, we used a CNN, DNN, and
RNN respectively, to uniquely identify it. We used 90%, 5%, and 5% to train, validate and test
respectively. The overall accuracy of the different NNs for the task of trusted transmitter classi-
fication is shown in Table 3.3. We see that the CNN does not exhibit the best performance for
transmitter classification, which intuitively is due to the lack of distinguishing spatial correlation
in the data from each transmitter. In Fig. 3.26, we show a graphical representation of the classifi-
cation accuracy obtained using the different neural network architectures.
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We present the observed empirical training time for each model as the last column in Table 3.3.
It is evident that the training time for the CNN is almost double compared to the rest of the pro-
posed models, as convolution operations are significantly more complex than other neural network
computations. We also conducted experiments by varying the number of transmitters from 2 to 8,
using the proposed DNN. In Fig. 3.25, we show how the training and testing accuracy varies as the
number of transmitters are increased. We note that the training accuracy decreases when there are
more classes (more number of transmitters). However the testing accuracy of the model is stable
and does not change significantly with the increase in the number of transmitters. This establishes
the efficacy of these methods for the task of transmitter classification, as for production systems
one wants the test accuracy to be stable no matter the number of classes involved in the problem.
Table 3.3: Comparison of the Various Implementations
#Trans Models #Parameters Acc (%) Time (min)
4 CNN 38 Million 89.07 ∼25
4 DNN 6.8 Million 96.49 ∼12
4 RNN - LSTM 14.2 Million 97.40 ∼12
4 RNN - GRU 10.7 Million 97.85 ∼12
8 CNN 38 Million 81.59 ∼30
8 DNN 6.8 Million 94.60 ∼15
8 RNN - LSTM 14.2 Million 95.78 ∼16
8 RNN - GRU 10.7 Million 97.06 ∼16
In our testbed evaluation one of the goals was to explore different types of NNs to find the archi-
tecture (and model) having the best possible accuracy within the constraints of the training time
(which was not more than 30 minutes in our test-bed setup for all models). The performance of
any NN architecture depends, among other things, on the values of the hyper-parameters. Further-
more, as a given hyper-parameter setting may be optimal for one network but not for another, we
used different hyper-parameter values to train different networks. Intuitively, this dependence on
the values of the hyper-parameters is due to the fact that the underlying optimization problem and
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hence the solution space, is different for different types of networks. We observed that decreasing
the learning rate of the CNN to 10−4 increases the accuracy by 7-8%. However, decreasing the
learning rate to less than 10−3 for RNN and DNN does not improve the testing accuracy by a sig-
nificant amount (even by 0.5%). In Table 3.4 we record the values which gave the best possible
accuracy under the constraints of the training time. During each training, we set the maximum
epoch to 50 with an early stopping condition, such as, if there is no improvement of validation
loss for five consecutive epochs, then the training is stopped. We observed through multiple runs
of training, that each of the models converged within a given range of the maximum number of
epochs, as presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Comparison of Configuration Settings for Different Models
Models #Layers Learning Rate Batch Size Epochs Optimizer
CNN 7 10−4 128 45-50 Adam [42]
DNN 5 10−3 128 35-40 Adam [42]
RNN-LSTM 6 10−3 128 30-35 SGD [11]
RNN-GRU 6 10−3 128 30-35 SGD [11]















Figure 3.25: Training and Accuracy with Increasing numbers of Transmitters
It is clear from the the results presented above that the GAN based NN is effective for the task
of rogue transmitter identification whereas DNN and RNN are effective for the task of trusted



















































Figure 3.26: Detection Accuracies of the Neural Networks
1. A GAN is able to distinguish between Trusted and Counterfeited RF transmitters.
2. CNN yields 81%-86% accuracy for trusted transmitter classification proving the inefficacy
of spatial correlation as a discriminative attribute for transmitter classification.
3. DNN yields 94-97% accuracy for known transmitter classification.
4. RNN yields an accuracy of 97% for known transmitter classification using GRU cells.
5. Comparing the accuracies, we can conclude that I/Q data of radio signals exhibits more
temporal correlation than spatial correlation.
6. DNN or RNN can be used for transmitter fingerprinting for identifying trusted transmitters




In this section we present the computational time complexity for the training phase only, as the
trained model gives the output within constant time (O(1)) during the deployment phase. Under-
standing the time complexity of training a NN is still an evolving research area. In [51], the authors
proved that a NN of depth δ can be learned in poly(s2δ) time, where s is the dimension of the in-
put, and poly(.) takes a constant time depending on the configuration of the system. However, the
convolution operations of CNN add additional time complexity along with the forward and back-
propagation operations. In [34], the authors mentioned that the time complexity for training all the






τ ), where ζ is the number of convolutional layers, τ
is the index of a convolutional layer, ητ−1 is the number of input channels of the τ th layer, ντ is
the spatial size of the filters at the τ th layer, ητ is the number of filters at the τ th layer and ρτ is the
size of the output features of the τ th layer. In the proposed CNN model, we have 3 convolutional
layers, and 4 fully connected layers and hence we add in additional time complexity for training
the three convolutional layers.
The time complexities for each implemented NN model is presented in Table 3.5, using the afore-
mentioned results on time complexity of neural network training. The numbers within the paren-
thesis in the second column represents the total number of layers for a particular model. Note that
we have two different datasets of dimensions 160K and 320K and as mentioned earlier, we use
95% of data for training and validation purpose. For example, the complexity for GAN with 8
layers using 95% of 160e3 data samples for training and validation, is poly(0.95 × 160e328). On
another note we should mention that for quick estimates of the time complexity of training neural
networks, the number of hyper-parameters (as presented in Table 3.3) can also be used as a mea-
sure of the required training time. Thus, the more the number of hyper-parameters, the more the
training time required.
67
Table 3.5: Time Complexities for Training of the Various Implementations
#Trans Models Complexity
4 GAN (8) poly(0.95× 160e328)









4 DNN (5) poly(0.95× 160e325)
4 RNN - LSTM (6) poly(0.95× 160e326)
4 RNN - GRU (6) poly(0.95× 160e326)
8 GAN (8) poly(0.95× 320e328)









8 DNN (5) poly(0.95× 320e325)
8 RNN - LSTM (6) poly(0.95× 320e326)
8 RNN - GRU (6) poly(0.95× 320e327)
3.5.8 Experiments with Heterogeneous Dataset
So far, we have used the proposed trusted transmitter identification models on “homogeneous”
datasets in that the transmitters were implemented using the SDRs from the same manufacturer.
However, in reality the trusted transmitters can be from several different manufacturers. Now we
want to explore how the accuracy of the trusted transmitter identification system would change if
“heterogeneous” data obtained from different types of transmitters (manufacturers) (as was dis-
cussed in Section 3.4.3) was used. From the testing accuracy as shown in Table 3.6 we observe
that all the NNs perform better when the transmitters are from different manufacturers and hence
are fundamentally of different types. This confirms the intuition that radios manufactured using
different processes (from different manufacturers) contain easily exploitable characteristics in their
I/Q samples, that can be implicitly learned using a NN. We also observe that the CNN can exploit
the spatial correlation better for the heterogeneous dataset, yielding a 11.2% increase in the testing
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accuracy compared to the homogeneous dataset.
Table 3.6: Comparison of testing Accuracies for Different Classification Models for Homogeneous
and Heterogeneous Datasets
Models USRP-USRP PLUTO-USRP
CNN 89.91 (%) 99.91 (%)
DNN 99.9 (%) 100 (%)
RNN 99.95 (%) 100 (%)
3.5.9 Existing Transmitter Classification Techniques Comparisons
Though RFAL demonstrates the use of adversarial learning for rogue transmitter identification,
a part of our work has been devoted to the problem of “trusted transmitter classification” after
elimination of the rogue transmitters. “Trusted transmitter” identification systems when augmented
with adversarial learning systems, as was done in RFAL, results in robust transmitter identification
systems that are immune to presence of adversarial transmissions. Though our focus was not on
improving or building novel “trusted transmitter” classification systems, we have explored the use
of deep learning for building the same using I/Q data from the received signal. In this section we
present a comparative study of our approach to “trusted transmitter classification with I/Q data”
against some existing techniques for “transmitter classification” and the results of this endeavor is
shown in Tables 3.7 for traditional approaches (low accuracy) and 3.8 for “state-of-the-art” (high
accuracy) respectively. Note that here the “Inputs” column refers to the type of inputs used for
the classification algorithms. It is to be noted that all the traditional methods use some form of
extracted features (obtained through pre-processing of the data) as inputs ( [41, 86, 94, 101]), or
work with synthetic dataset ( [73]). A few existing work on modulation recognition [65, 67, 68]
using NN based approaches also work on synthetic datasets [63,72] and hence they do not yield to
a fair comparison with our “trusted transmitter classification” approach as well.
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For the “state-of-the-art” approaches, we observe that the test bed experiments have used various
types of SDRs for obtaining over-the-air data, or used datasets from actual infrastructure trans-
mitters (ACARS etc.). We present comparison with: (i) [75], where same SDR (USRP B210)
was used, (ii) [102] and [85], where different SDRs from the same manufacturer (USRP N210,
USRP X310) were used, (iii) [55], where different types of devices (Zigbee) were used, and
(iv) [109], [17] and [56] where different datasets (ACARS [4], ADS-B [5], FIT/CorteXlab [53])
were used.
The RFAL “trusted transmitter identification” models outperform [55] where the authors achieved
91.38% accuracy for classifying 7 Zigbee devices. The CNN proposed in [75] achieved 98% ac-
curacy for 5 USRP B210 with preprocessed data (from MATLAB Communication Systems Tool-
box). Similarly, in [85], Sankhe et al. presented a CNN classifier with 16 X310 radios with
99.5% accuracy, but that method used demodulated symbols rather than raw signal data. Youssef
et al. presented a multi-stage training model to achieve 100% accuracy to classify 12 USRP N210s.
Multi-stage training is a complex procedure and needs a easily parallelizable training environment,
whereas CNN and DNN use a first-order update rule (stochastic gradient) and are comparatively
simple procedures. For the sake of generality, we compare their proposed DNN method (which has
the best accuracy compared to other implemented ML methods) in Table 3.8. The CNN models
presented in [109], [17] and [56] achieved between 96% and 99.9% accuracy for existing datasets
(ACARS [4], ADS-B [5], FIT/CorteXlab [53]).
We need to point out that none of methods discussed above are robust enough to work in adver-
sarial settings. Thus if there is an adversarial transmitter then all the aforementioned methods
will fail. However RFAL, due to its adversarial training will be able to identify the adversarial
transmitter and eliminate it from consideration before classifying the “trusted transmitters”, thus
being more resilient and robust to such interference. Even if we just compare the “trusted transmit-
ter” classification of RFAL with the methods discussed above, our method for “trusted transmitter
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classification” achieves the same accuracy (of 97%) using just the raw I/Q data as input, thereby
paving the way for real-time deployment of “transmitter fingerprinting” systems.
Considering the state-of-art, and to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to:
1. propose a GAN based model to detect rogue transmitters from authentic ones;
2. demonstrate a high accuracy (97%) to classify 8 USRP B210s using an RNN model consid-
ering the temporal property of RF data;
3. present a testbed evaluation for classifying transmitters from different manufacturers;
4. provide an end-to-end solution of RF transmitter classification without any preprocessing of
raw data. The raw data can be captured through any SDR and is identified by the proposed
models at once;
5. propose RNN based models which needed half the training time than CNN models for the
same experimental training time. Our proposed RNN model entails to be faster than all
state-of-the art CNN models for the same experimental environment.
Table 3.7: Comparison of the Our Implementation with the Traditional ones
Approach #Trans SNR (dB) Acc (%) Inputs
Genetic Algorithm [94] 5 25 85-98 Transients
Multifractal Not
Segmentation [86] 8 mentioned 92.5 Transients
Orthogonal Component Spurious
Reconstruction (OCR) [101] 3 20 62 - 71 Modulation
k-NN [41] 8 30 97 Transients
RNN [73] - 20 90 Synthetic Dataset [72]
RFAL (Ours) 8 30 97.04 Raw Signal
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Table 3.8: Comparison of the Our Implementation with State-of-the-art
Approach #Trans SNR (dB) Acc (%) Input
CNN [55] 7 30 91.38 Preprocessed data
from MATLAB
CNN [75] 5 50 98 Preprocessed data
from MATLAB
CNN [109] - - 99.67 ACARS data [4]
DNN [102] 12 - 84.4 Raw signal
Inception - - 98.1 & 96.3 ACARS [4] &
ResNet [17] ADS-B [5]
CNN [85] 16 30 99.5 Demodulated symbols
CNN [56] 21 - 99.99 FIT/CorteXlab [53]
RNN (Ours) 8 30 97.04 Raw signal
3.5.10 Performance Comparison for Varying SNR
In this section, we present the results of RFAL “trusted transmitter classification” for varying SNR
values. We compare the accuracy for the proposed NN models having 8 USRP B210s with 30 dB
SNR, with 3 other datasets collected at 0 dB, 10 dB, and 30 dB SNRs having the same number of
transmitters (8 B210s) as shown in Table 3.9. It is seen that we achieve better accuracy with all the
models for higher SNR values, which is intuitive. It is to be noted that the proposed RNN (with
GRU cell) model gives more than 92% accuracy at 0 dB SNR too, whereas CNN and DNN models
fail to achieve that.
It must be pointed out that the proposed NN models can be a trained using raw signal data from any
type of radio transmitter. We would also like to point out that though our data was collected in a lab
setting, we had no control over the RF environment: there were other transmissions, uncontrolled
movement of people, and multi-path effects due to the location and layout of the lab. Moreover,
the power of the transmitters was low which compounded the problem further. Thus, though we
mention that the data was collected in a lab environment, in reality it was an uncontrolled RF
environment reflective of our surroundings. We can safely argue that the proposed methods will
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perform equally well in any real world deployment of large scale radio networks.
Table 3.9: Accuracies for Different Neural Network Models with Varying SNRs
SNR(dB) Accuracy (%)
CNN DNN RNN (GRU)
0 51.53 85.12 92.3
10 78.64 92.24 95.64
20 81.3 94.60 97.02
30 81.59 94.60 97.06
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we address the problem of building a robust and resilient model for identifying sim-
ilar RF transmitters in the presence of adversaries. We argue that non-adversarial machine learn-
ing techniques would not be effective in adversarial settings and that breakthroughs in generative
adversarial nets (GANs) can be instrumental in building such systems for detection of rogue trans-
mitters and subsequent accurate identification of known ones in such settings. We propose and
implement RF Adversarial Learning (RFAL) framework which includes a discriminative model
for identifying rogue transmitters trained with data generated from a generative model. RFAL also
contains a “trusted transmitter” identification system that for categorizing the known transmitters
once the adversarial transmitters have been identified and eliminated from consideration. We col-
lected over-the-air raw I/Q data using USRP B210s and used that to train the GAN. The discrimina-
tor was able to detect rogue transmitters with an accuracy of∼99.9%. As for the subsequent trusted
transmitter classification, we first implemented a CNN (accuracy ∼89%) for exploiting the spatial
correlation between the I/Q data. Then we designed and implemented a fully connected DNN and
RNNs both of which obtained an accuracy of around 97% for trusted transmitter identification. We
also show how the proposed NN models for “trusted transmitter classification” (especially CNN)
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worked when radios from different manufacturers were used. RFAL will be able to detect any ac-
tive attack that involves a secondary device to pose as an authentic emitter, such as replay attacks,
but it will not be able to detect passive attackers, such as traffic sniffers. Going forward we would
like to use these methods for identification of actual infrastructure transmitters (for example FM,
AM or GSM) in contested real world settings.
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSMITTER FINGERPRINTING USING
RECURRENT STRUCTURES
In this chapter, we propose a transmitter fingerprinting technique for radio device identification
using recurrent structures, by exploiting the temporal property of the received radio signal. We
design and implement three recurrent neural networks (RNNs) using different types of cell models:
(i) long short term memory (LSTM); (ii) gated recurrent unit (GRU) and (iii) convolutional long
short term memory (ConvLSTM), for this task. We program 8 universal software radio peripheral
(USRP) software defined radios (SDRs) as transmitters and collect over-the-air raw in-phase (I) and
quadrature (Q) (I/Q) time series data from them using a DVB-T RTL-SDR receiver, in a laboratory
setting. We exploit both the temporal variations as well as the inherent spatial dependencies in the
collected I/Q time series data, to learn unique feature representations and use these as “fingerprints”
for identifying the transmitters. Experimental results reveal that the RNNs with LSTM, GRU, and
ConvLSTM cells are able to correctly distinguish between the 8 transmitters with 95%, 97%, 98%
accuracy respectively.
The chapter is organized as follows: in the first section, we present a survey of existing machine
learning based transmitter identification techniques. In section 4.1, we propose different RNN
models. In section 4.2, we present the testbed setup and experiments that we conduct to evaluate
the proposed models. We present the experimental results in section 4.3. The contents of this
chapter appeared in [76, 81].
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4.1 Proposed RNN Models for Classification
Neural networks have previously been used for transmitter identification [65, 68, 79] and are par-
ticularly attractive since they can generate accurate models without knowledge of the apriori data
distribution. Neural networks have been shown to be able to predict modulation techniques [65]
and identify transmitters [79] by only considering the spatial correlations within the actual [68] or
synthetic RF data [63]. It is to be noted that all prior works have only exploited the spatial correla-
tion of the signal data, though a continuous signal can be represented as a time series, having both
temporal and spatial properties [98].
Inspired by the success of deep learning systems for the task of characterizing RF environments [67]
and the successful use of recurrent neural networks (RNN) for the task of analyzing time series
data [74], we propose to use deep recurrent structures for learning transmitter “fingerprints” for
the task of transmitter identification. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) [31] have been shown
to be useful for capturing and exploiting the temporal correlations of time series data. There are a
few variants of recurrent neural networks: (i) Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [35], (ii) Gated
Recurrent Unit (GRU) [19], and (iii) Convolutional Long Short-Term Memory (ConvLSTM) [87].
All these variants are designed to learn the long term temporal dependencies and are capable of
avoiding the “vanishing” or “exploding” gradient problems [24].
In order to estimate the noise in a RF channel, the system needs to “listen” to the underlying signal
for sometime and “remember” the same. Previously, neural networks lacked this capability when
used in the context of temporal data. Another issue with using neural networks with temporal
data was the problem of vanishing gradients, when trying to use back propagation. Both these
problems were solved by the introduction of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) [45].
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4.1.1 Formulation of temporal property of RF data
Given T training samples (for T timestamps) where each training sample is of size of M and
consists of a vector of tuples of the form (I,Q) ∈ C representing a number in the complex plane,
we represent a single sample as xt = [[(I,Q)i]t; i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ] ∈ CM for each timestamp
t = 1, 2, · · · , T , and we use it as an input to the neural network. We use a sample size (M ) of 1024
as a default. We want to find the probability of the input vector for next time step (xt+1) to belong
to class Ck, where k ∈ 1, 2, . . . , K, K being the number of classes. The probability P (Ck|xt+1)





where (P (xt|Ck)) is the conditional probability of xt given the class Ck and (P (xtxx+1)) is the
probability of xt and xt+1 occurring in order.
The details of used LSTM and GRU cell models are described in Section 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2 in
Chapter 3. So we next describe the details of convolutional LSTM network.
4.1.2 Convolutional LSTM Network Model
The recurrent neural networks with LSTM or GRU cells, do not consider the spatial information
encoded in the the input-to-state or state-to-state transitions. To mitigate this problem, we use a
convolution within the recurrent structure of the RNN. We first discuss the spatio-temporal property
of RF data and then model a convolutional LSTM network to exploit the same.
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4.1.2.1 Formulation of Spatio-temporal property for RF data
Suppose that a radio signal is represented as a time varying series over a spatial region using R
rows and C columns. Here R represents the time varying nature of the signal and as such in our
case it represents the total number of time stamps at which the signal was sampled (T in our case).
C on the other hand represents the total number of features sampled at each time stamp (in our
case its 2048 since there are 1024 features sampled each of dimension 2). Note that each cell
corresponding to one value of R and one value of C represents a particular feature (I or Q) at a
given point in time.
In order to capture the temporal property only, we use a sequence of vectors corresponding to
different timestamps 1, 2, · · · , t as x1, x2, · · · , xt. However, to capture both spatial and temporal
properties, we introduce a new vector χt,t+γ , which is formulated as: χt,t+γ = [xt, xt+1, · · · , xt+γ−1].
So the vector χt,t+γ eventually preserves the spatial properties with an increment of γ in time. So,
we get a sequence of new vectors χ1,γ, χγ,2γ, · · · χt,t+γ, · · · , χt+(β−1)γ,t+βγ , where β is bR/γc, and
the goal is to create a model to classify them into one of the K classes (corresponding to the trans-
mitters). We model the class-conditional densities given by P (χt−γ,t|Ck), where k ∈ 1, · · · , K.
We formulate the probability of the next γ-length sequence to be in class Ck as per equation 4.2.





4.1.2.2 The ConvLSTM Model
The cell model is similar to an LSTM cell, but the input transformations and recurrent transforma-
tions are both convolutional in nature [87]. We formulate the input values, cell state and hidden
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states as a 3-dimensional vector, where the first dimension is the number of measurements which
varies with the time interval γ and the last two dimensions contain the spatial information (rows (R)
and columns (C)). We represent these as: (i) the inputs: χ1,γ, χγ,2γ, · · · χt,t+γ, · · · , χt+(β−1)γ,t+βγ
(previously stated); (ii) cell outputs: C1, · · · , Ct, and (iii) hidden states: H1, · · · ,Ht. We represent
the gates in a similar manner as in the LSTM model. The parameters t, it, ft, ot, W , b hold the
same meaning as in Section 3.3.3.1 in Chapter 3. The key operations are defined in equations 4.3,
4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. The probability of the next γ-sequence to be in a particular class (from
equation 4.2) is used within the implementation and execution of the model.
it = σ(Wxiχt,t+γ +WhiHt−1 + bi) (4.3)
ft = σ(Wxfχt,t+γ +WhfHt−1 + bf ) (4.4)
Ct = ft ◦ Ct−1 + it. tanh(Wxcχt,t+γ +WhcHt−1 + bc) (4.5)
ot = σ(Wxoχt,t+γ +WhoHt−1 + bo) (4.6)
Ht = ot ◦ tanh(Ct) (4.7)
4.2 Testbed Evaluation
In order to validate the proposed models, we collected raw signal data from 8 different universal
software radio peripheral (USRP) B210s [26]. We collected the data in an indoor lab environment
79
with a signal-to-noise ratio of 30 dB, and used the dataset to distinguish between 4 or 8 transmitters,
as mentioned in [79].
4.2.1 Signal Generation and Data Collection
In order to evaluate our methods for learning the inherent spatio-temporal features of a transmitter,
we used eight USRPs of the same type, namely B210 from Ettus Research [26], as transmitters.
The signal generation and reception are shown in Fig. 4.1. We used GNURadio [29] to randomly
generate signal and modulated the same with Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK). We pro-
grammed the USRP B210s to transmit the modulated signal over the air and sensed the same using
a DVB-T dongle (RTL-SDR) [60]. We generated the entire dataset from “over-the-air” data as








Figure 4.1: Over the Air Signal Generation and Data Collection Technique
We collected I/Q signal data with a sample size of 1024 at each time stamp. Each data sample
had 2048 entries consisting of the I and Q values for the 1024 samples. Note that a larger sample
size would mean more training examples for the neural network. Our choice of 1024 samples was
sufficient to capture the spatial-temporal properties while at the same time the training was not
computationally intensive. We collected 40,000 training examples from each transmitter to avoid
the data skewness problem observed in machine learning. The configuration parameters that were
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used are given in Table 4.1. We collected two sets of data: (i) using 4 transmitters: 6.8 GB size,
160K rows and 2048 columns and (ii) using 8 transmitters: 13.45 GB size, 320K rows and 2048
columns.
Table 4.1: Transmission Configuration Parameters
Parameters Values
Transmitter Gain 45 dB




# Transmitters 4 and 8
4.2.2 Spatial Correlation in the Dataset
The wokring principle of correlation calculation in the collected RF data is already described in
Section 3.4.4 in Chapter 3. The spatial correlations of all the samples for the different transmitters
are shown in Fig. 4.2. We observe that for most of the transmitters, the correlation is ∼0.42,
with a standard deviation of ∼0.2. However, transmitter 3 exhibits minimal correlation between
these samples, which implies that the spatial property of transmitter 3 is different from the other
transmitters. As a result Transmitter 3 should be easily distinguishable from the others. This
claim will be validated later in the experimental result section where we see 0% false positive
and false negative for transmitter 3 for all the three proposed models. This observation gives us
the motivation to exploit the spatial property as well as the temporal property for the collected
time-series data.
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Correlation in the Dataset
4.2.3 Neural Network Libraries
There are many libraries available in python with support for different types of neural network
and concurrent GPU architecture. We use Keras [18] as the frontend and Tensorflow [1] as the
backend for our implementations. Keras is an overlay on the neural network primitives provided
by Tensorflow [1] or Theano [2] and provides a customizable interface for quick deployment of
complex neural networks. We also use Numpy, Scipy, and Matplotlib Python libraries.
4.2.4 Experimental Setup and Performance Metrics
We conducted the experiments on a Ryzen 8 Core system with 64 GB RAM, a GTX 1080 Ti GPU
unit having 11 GB memory. During the training phase, we use data from each transmitter to train
the neural network model. In order to test the resulting trained model, we use test data collected
from one of the transmitters and present the same to the trained network. In general to measure
the effectiveness of any learning algorithm, “accuracy” is used as the typical performance metric.
However, accuracy can sometimes be misleading and incomplete when the data is skewed. For the
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task of classification, a confusion matrix overcomes this problem by showing how confused the
learned model is on its predictions. It provides more insights on the performance by identifying
not only the number of errors, but more importantly the types of errors.
4.3 Implementations and Results
In this section we discuss the implementation of each of the proposed recurrent neural networks.
We train each network for transmitter classification with K classes. For the sake of robustness and
statistical significance, we present the results for each model after averaging over several runs.
4.3.1 Implementation with LSTM Cells
As discussed earlier, the recurrent structure of the neural network can be used to exploit the tem-
poral correlation in the data. To that end, we first implemented a recurrent neural network with
LSTM cells and trained it on the collected dataset using the paradigm as shown in Fig. 4.3. We
used two LSTM layers with 1024 and 256 units sequentially. We also used a dropout rate of 0.5
in between these two LSTM layers. Next we used two fully connected (Dense) layers with 512
and 256 nodes respectively. We apply a dropout rate of 0.2, and add batch normalization [38]
on the output, finally passing it through a Dense layer having 8 nodes. We use ReLU [58] as
the activation function for the LSTM layers and tanh [11] for the Dense layers. Lastly, we use
stochastic gradient descent [11] based optimization with categorical cross-entropy training. Note
that the neural network architecture was finalized over several iterations of experimentation with
the data and we are only reporting the final architecture here. We achieved 97.17% and 95.00%
testing accuracy for 4 and 8 transmitters respectively. The accuracy plots and confusion matrices
are shown in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. Note that the number of nodes in the last layer is equal
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to the number of classes in the dataset. It is also to be noted that during the process of designing
the RNN architecture, we also fine tuned the hyper-parameters based generalization ability of the
current network (as determined by comparing the training and validation errors). We also limited
the number of recurrent layers and fully connected layers for each model for faster training [34],
since no significant increase in the validation accuracy was observed after increasing the number
of layers.
The rows and columns of the confusion matrix correspond to the number of transmitters (classes)
and the cell values show the recall or sensitivity and false negative rate for each of the transmitters.


















































2048) 1024 256 512 256 8 8
Figure 4.3: RNN Implementation with LSTM Cells for Transmitter Classification
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.4: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using LSTM Cells
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(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.5: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using LSTM Cells
4.3.2 Implementation with GRU Cells
Next we implemented another variation of the RNN model using GRU cells for leveraging temporal
correlation. We used the same architecture as the LSTM implementation, presented in Fig. 4.6.
The proposed GRU implementation needs fewer parameters than the LSTM model. A quantitative
comparison is given in Section 4.3.5. The only difference is that we use two GRU layers with
1024 and 256 units instead of using LSTM cells. We achieved 97.76% and 97% testing accuracy
for 4 and 8 transmitters respectively. The accuracy plots and confusion matrices are given in Figs.
4.7 and 4.8. The GRU implementation provided a slight improvement over the accuracy obtained
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Figure 4.6: RNN Implementation with GRU Cells for Transmitter Classification
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(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.7: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using GRU Cells
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.8: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using GRU Cells
4.3.3 Implementation with ConvLSTM2D Cells
Finally, in order to exploit the spatio-temporal property of the signal data, we implemented an-
other variation of the LSTM model with convolutional filters (transformations). The implemented
architecture is shown in Fig. 4.9. ConvLSTM2D uses two dimensional convolutions for both in-
put transformations and recurrent transformations. We first use two layers of convLSTM2D with
1024 and 256 filters respectively, and a dropout rate of 0.5 in between. We use kernel size of
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(2,2) and stride of (2,2) at each ConvLSTM2D layer. Next we add two fully connected (Dense)
layers having 512 and 256 nodes respectively after flattening the convolutional output. ReLU [58],
and tanh [11] activation functions are used for the convLSTM2D and Dense layers respectively.
ADADELTA [104] with a learning rate of 10−4 and a decay rate of 0.9, is used as the optimizer
with categorical cross-entropy training. We achieved 98.9% and 98% testing accuracy for 4 and
8 transmitters respectively. The accuracy plots and confusion matrices are given in Figs. 4.10 and
4.11 respectively. Being able to exploit the spatio-temporal correlation, ConvLSTM implemen-
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Flatten
Figure 4.9: RNN Implementation with ConvLSTM Cells for Transmitter Classification
(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.10: Accuracy Plots for Transmitter Classification using ConvLSTM Cells
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(a) 4 Transmitters (b) 8 Transmitters
Figure 4.11: Confusion Matrices for Transmitter Classification using ConvLSTM Cells
4.3.4 Comparisons of LSTM/GRU/ConvLSTM Implementations
We used 90%, 5%, and 5% of the data to train, validate, and test respectively. We ran each model
for 50 epochs with early-stopping on the validation set. One epoch consists of a forward pass and
a backward pass through the implemented architecture for the entire dataset. The overall accuracy
of the different implementations is shown in Table 4.2. We find that the implementation of con-
volutional layers with recurrent structure (ConvLSTM2D) exhibit the best accuracy for transmitter
classification, which clearly shows the advantage of using the spatio-temporal correlation present
in the collected datasets.
Table 4.2: Accuracy for Different Implementations
#Trans Models #Parameters Acc (%)
4 LSTM (6 layers) 14.2 M 97.17
4 GRU (6 layers) 10.7 M 97.76
4 ConvLSTM (6 layers) 14.2 M 98.90
8 LSTM (6 layers) 14.2 M 95.00
8 GRU (6 layers) 10.7 M 97.02
8 ConvLSTM (6 layers) 14.2 M 98
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4.3.5 Comparisons of Proposed and Existing Approaches
Next we present two comparative studies of our proposed implementations with some existing
techniques. We introduce a differential analysis of different RNN based implementations in the RF
domain in Table 4.3. Another comparative study for different transmitter classification techniques
is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.3: Comparison of Proposed Approach with the Existing RNN Implementations
Approaches Model SNR (dB) Acc (%) Inputs
Traffic Sequence
Recognition [62] LSTM 20 31.2 Hybrid Real-synthetic Dataset
Automatic Modulation
Classification [73] LSTM 20 90 Synthetic Dataset [72]
Transmitter
Classification (Ours) ConvLSTM 30 98 Raw Signal
Table 4.4: Comparison of the Our Implementation with the Existing Transmitter Classification
Approaches
Approach #Trans SNR (dB) Acc (%) Inputs
Orthogonal Component Spurious
Reconstruction (OCR) [101] 3 20 62 - 71 Modulation
Genetic Algorithm [94] 5 25 85-98 Transients
Multifractal Not
Segmentation [86] 8 mentioned 92.5 Transients
k-NN [41] 8 30 97.2 Transients
Ours 8 30 98 Raw Signal
The “Inputs” column in both the tables refer to the type of inputs used for the methods under
consideration. Table 4.3 shows a comparison of our ConvLSTM based RNN for transmitter clas-
sification with other RNN based implementations for separate tasks like modulation recognition
and traffic sequence recognition. Table 4.4 establishes the efficacy of our ConvLSTM based RNN
model for the task of transmitter classification by comparing the accuracy with that obtained using
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other methods, for the same task. It is to be noted that all the other methods use expert crafted
features as inputs ( [41, 86, 94, 101]), or work with synthetic datasets ( [62], [73]). Our method,
on the other hand achieves superior accuracy (98%) using features automatically learned from
the raw signal data, thereby paving the way for real-time deployment of large scale transmitter
identification systems.
It must be pointed out that the proposed RNN models can be a trained using raw signal data from
any type of radio transmitter operating both in indoor as well as outdoor environments. We would
also like to point out that though our data was collected in a lab environment, we had no control
over the environment, there were other transmissions in progress, people were moving in and out
of the lab and there was a lot of multi-path due to the location and design of the lab. Furthermore
the power of the transmitters was low and hence this compounded the problem further. Given this,
though we say that the data was collected in a lab environment, in reality it was an uncontrolled
daily use environment reflective of our surroundings. Thus we can safely say that these methods
will work in any real world deployment of large scale radio network. In summary,
• Exploiting temporal correlation only, recurrent neural networks yield 95-97% accuracy for
transmitter classification using LSTM or GRU cells. RNN implementation with GRU cells
needs fewer parameters than LSTM cells as shown in Table 4.2.
• Exploiting spatio-temporal correlation, the implementation of RNN using ConvLSTM2D
cells provides better accuracy (98-99%) for transmitter classification, thus providing a po-
tential tool for building automatic real world transmitter identification systems.
• We present a comparative study of the proposed spatio-temporal property based fingerprint-
ing with the existing traditional and neural network based models. This clearly shows that




In this chapter, we proposed a robust transmitter identification technique by exploiting both the
inherent spatial and temporal properties of RF signal data. We designed and implemented three
different types of neural network models for this purpose. We collected over-the-air signal data
from USRP B210s and used the same to train and validate our system. The RNN model using
LSTM cells yields 95% testing accuracy leveraging only temporal property of the signal data.
The one using GRU cells does the same with lower space requirement and yields a better testing
accuracy of 97.02%. Finally, the RNN model with ConvLSTM cell achieves 98% testing accuracy
for the same dataset leveraging both the temporal and spatial correlations.
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CHAPTER 5: DEFENSE AGAINST PUE ATTACK USING GAN BASED
LEARNING
In this chapter, we present a solution towards the PUE attacks. We present two generative adver-
sarial net (GAN) [32] based models to successfully emulate the primary users (PUs) in two ways.
We propose a (i) dumb generator model without any “prior" knowledge of PU’s feature space, (ii)
a smart generator model with some “prior" knowledge about PU’s transmission. Any GAN based
model works on a synergistic training of two neural networks: (i) a generator, and (ii) a discrimi-
nator. Therefore, we use generated malicious entities to train the discriminator for “yet to be seen”
real PUE attackers. We propose two deep neural network based discriminator models to discrim-
inate between the PU and the emulated primary users (EPU) from the corresponding generators.
Both the generator and discriminator of each GAN model gets smarter with iterative and sequen-
tial GAN training. Through a testbed evaluation, we show that discriminators are able to catch
∼50% of PUE attackers without the GAN training during the deployment phase. We also observe
100% accuracy for both the GAN models during training phase. Ultimately, after the GAN train-
ing, the discriminators achieved 98% and 99.5% accuracies, for dumb and smart generator models
respectively, to distinguish “yet to be seen" PUE attacker.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 5.1 proposes a GAN based mechanism to train a cen-
tralized module to defend against the PUE attacker. In section 5.2, we present the implementation
and experimental results of our proposed approach. The contents of this chapter appeared in [78].
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5.1 Proposed GAN Approach
In this section we propose a GAN based approach to present a robust defense mechanism for
PUE attack. In a GAN, we have one generator and one discriminator. We propose two GAN
based models: (i) one model which will work without any prior knowledge about the PU or the
CRN, (ii) the other with the assumption, that the attacker will have prior information about the
PUs characteristics for that CRN. So, for the first case we take the SU to work as a dumb emulated
primary user (EPU). However, in the second case the EPU is smart to gather or know all the helpful
prior information about the PU transmission, so we call those as smart EPUs. Few examples of
prior knowledge that an attacker could leverage to mimic the PUs characteristics are: (i) a set of
modulation schemes which the PUs use, (ii) the used frequency band, (iii) channel bandwidth for
PU’s transmission, (iv) geographical location of the PU’s transmitter, (v) sample space and sample
size of the PU transmission, and so on.
5.1.1 GAN based Problem Formulation for PUEA Defense
A GAN framework comprises of two distinct models: the generator (G) which learns the real data
distribution and generates the “mimicked” data, and the discriminator (D) which tries to distinguish
the mimicked data from the “real” data by estimating the probability that the sample came from
the real data rather than the G. The overall idea is that, during the training phase the generators
will pose as a selfish or malicious PUE attacker and make the discriminator stronger in order to
fight against the real selfish and malicious PUE attackers during the deployment phase. We call the
selfish and malicious PUE attackers as emulated primary users (EPU), and the legitimate primary
users as PUs. We use a centralized spectrum allocator and train it using the GAN model and
therefore work as a robust discriminator during deployment.
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5.1.1.1 Generative Model
The generative model has two main inputs, (i) prior information about the PU’s feature space
(s(t)), (ii) a additive Gaussian white noise (n(t)). The noise is added with the prior information,
z(t) = s(t) + n(t). The output z(t) is then fed to the generator which works as a unsupervised
learning tool and learns the data distribution (pz(z)) of PU’s feature space. Note that we have
indexed the prior information, noise and the generated data by time t. This has been done to
acknowledge the fact that the signal characteristics can change over time. However for this work
we do not consider the effects of variation of the signal characteristics (prior information) and noise
with time and essentially assume that s(t) = s ∀t and n(t) = n ∀t. Hence we also get z(t) = z ∀t.
Recall, there are two types of EPUs, one is dumb and another smart. The generator for dumb EPU
is deprived of any prior information about the PU’s feature space, so s(t) for the generator model
of dumb EPU is random and does not reflect the actual signal characteristics of the PU. The cost
function of generator is denoted by V (G). The GAN model’s target is to minimize this cost, i.e.,
to minimize the probability of D correctly identifying the data from G.
5.1.1.2 Discriminative Model
The discriminator is fed with both real data (x) drawn from a data distribution pdata(x), and gen-
erated data from generator (z(t)). The objective of the discriminator is to successfully distinguish
between these two types, i.e., to learn the difference between pdata(x), and pz(z). The cost func-
tion for discriminator is denoted as V (D). The target of discriminator is to maximize its cost,
i.e., to increase probability to correctly identify samples from training examples and data from
G. Target of the overall GAN model is to minimize the cost for generator and maximize the
cost for discriminator. The overall cost V (G,D) is formulated as V (G,D) = Epdata(x) logD(x) +
Epz(z) log(1 − D(G(z))), where pz(z) is the generator’s distribution over generated data samples
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z, pdata(x) is the data distribution over real data samples x, D(x) is the probability that x came
from pdata(x) than pz(z). D(G(z)) represents the probability that x came from pz(z) than pdata(x).






Throughout the training phase, the GAN framework eventually converges to an unique optimal
discriminator for a particular generator, D∗(x) = pdata(x)
pdata(x) + pz(z)
. It is intuitive that D is optimal
when the discriminator can distinguish between each real sample (x) and generated sample (z).
Similarly, it is also deduced that G is optimal when the D cannot distinguish between x and z, G is




















Figure 5.1: Implementation of GAN in RF Domain
5.1.1.3 GAN Architecture
The overall GAN architecture is shown in Fig. 5.1. Once the generator (G(z)) is trained, it gen-
erates “mimicked” data from the data distribution (pz(z)) with the prior information. The trained
discriminator knows the difference between the mimicked data distribution (pz(z)) and real data
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distribution (pdata(x)), so it will try to distinguish the mimicked data (z) from the real data (x).
The activation function at discriminator is sigmoid. The feedback from the output is fed to both
G(z), and D(z). So ultimately the target of overall GAN model is to maximize the discriminator’s






















Figure 5.2: GAN Training in the Spectrum Allocator
5.1.2 GAN based Approach for PUEA Defense
The proposed method is compatible with the existing system of centralized spectrum allocation
for dynamic spectrum access implementations. The idea is to install a generator and discriminator
model inside the spectrum allocator. During the training phase, the discriminator is trained over the
generated data and real signal data from the legitimate PUs. The overall proposed training approach
is presented in Fig. 5.2. We train the discriminator over the generator model. We consider the
generator to be either one of the two types: (i) a generator posing as a dumb EPU, (ii) a generator
96
posing as a smart EPU. The smart EPUs collect the prior information about the feature space of the
PUs from a feature space extractor. The discriminator gets trained over both real (x) and generated
data (z) over iterations and become robust enough to distinguish between the real and synthetic
data. The output of the discriminator is fed to both the generator and discriminator models so as
to tune-up the hyper-parameters of each model, depending on the result. In this way, the generator
also gets smarter over each iteration and the discriminator gets smarter than the generator over the
next iteration. Thus we design the training in such a way that over time the discriminator eventually
over-powers the smartest possible generator model. Once the GAN training is complete, the trained




















Figure 5.3: Deployment of Trained Discriminator in Spectrum Sensing Scenario
During the deployment phase, the centralized spectrum allocator gets signal information from
spectrum sensors, and pass them through the trained discriminator before the spectrum is allocated.
The overall proposed approach for deploying the trained discriminator is shown in Fig. 5.3. In the
figure we consider 3 legitimate PUs, 1 dumb EPU, 1 smart EPU, and 2 SUs. The dumb EPU
does not have any prior knowledge about PU’s feature space, but the smart one has. The trained
discriminator is able to recognize the 2 EPUs as SU, despite the effort of the malicious entities.
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5.2 Implementation and Results
For implementing the GAN model, we use the proposed generator and discriminator models with
data collected from over-the-air RF transmission. Next we describe the data collection, experimen-
tal setup, implementation details, and experimental results.
5.2.1 Used Dataset and Experimental Setup
We use a dataset of raw I/Q values from 8 software defined radios (universal software radio
peripheral (USRP) B210 [26]). The details of I/Q data generation and data collection mecha-
nism is similar to [79], and [76]. As described in earlier chapters, each I/Q dataset comprises
T training samples (for T timestamps) and a sample size of N , where each sample is a vector
(I,Q) ∈ C representing a number in the complex plane. Each vector at timestamp t is represented
as: x(t) = [[(I,Q)i]t; i = 1, 2, · · · , N ] ∈ CN for timestamp t = 1, 2, · · · , T . We use these vectors
as input during GAN training. Note that though we collect the data with respect to different time
stamps, we do not treat the data thus collected as a time series for this work, that is we ignore the
temporal aspect of the data.
We conducted the testbed evaluation on a Ryzen 8 Core system with 64 GB RAM, a GTX 1080 Ti
GPU unit, and 11 GB memory. We used different machine learning libraries to design the proposed
GAN models. We useu Keras [18] as the frontend and Tensorflow [1] as the backend for the neural
network architectures used in GAN. We also use Numpy, Scipy, and Matplotlib python libraries for
implementation of different operations.
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5.2.2 GAN for Dumb PUE Attacker
In this case, the generator has no prior information. The generator starts by randomly generating
data within the sample space [X, Y ], where X and Y are random numbers. For our experiments,
we took X as 0 and Y as 1. This dumb generator picks a random sample size N . The randomly
generated data is then used as input to three dense layers of sizes N/2, N , and 2N respectively
with tanh activation function in the first two layers. The third neuron layer uses sigmoid activation
function, and generates data of size 2N .
The generator G(z) continues to learn the data distribution (pz(z)) and generates fake samples
of size 2N within a random sample space. The discriminator (D(x)) for the dumb generator is
simple. We first have one input layer of 2N nodes, which is followed by two hidden layers of
N and N/2 nodes respectively. Ultimately, a softmax output layer of 2 nodes is used to identify
whether the input is from a legitimate SU or malicious EPU. We use tanh as activation function at
the hidden layers and add Dropout [89] of 0.5 in between those layers to avoid overfitting. We also
use l1 regularization for the same purpose. The output from the last layer is fed to the layers of
generator as well as discriminator in the next epoch for tuning the parameters of both. One epoch
is actually a combination of a forward and a backward pass through the designed model over the
entire dataset. The overall GAN implementation using dumb generator is shown in Fig. 5.4. In this
case, the G(z), andD(x) are respectively 3-layered and 5-layered networks. In the figure, the solid
lines represent the connection between two layers, whereas the dotted lines represent the feedback
from output layer of the discriminator to the other layers of both generator and discriminator to be
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Figure 5.5: GAN Implementation for Smart Emulated Primary User
5.2.3 GAN for Smart PUE Attacker
In this case, generator G(z) has prior knowledge about some features of PUs. We get a sample
of size 1024 and sample space of [-1, 1] from the PU feature extractor. These features eventually
help the EPUs to better mimic legitimate PUs. In this set of experiments, we get the sample size
(N ) and the sample space from the “feature space extractor”. Feature space extractor is a module
in the spectrum allocator, which extracts features and builds a feature space for the PUs from the
sensed signal data. The GAN implementation with a smart generator is shown in Fig. 5.5. For
the sake of consistency and generality, we use the same number of layers as the dumb one, for
modeling the generator of smart EPU. However, knowing that the generator is smart, we design
the discriminator in a way that it is 1-layer more deep than the one for the dumb one. We use 2
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dense layers with N nodes instead of 1. So now the D(x) becomes a 6-layered network. The rest
of the generator and discriminator properties are similar as before.
5.2.4 Experimental Results
We perform two sets of experiments here: (i) first we train the GAN model on a dumb generator
and use the discriminator as discussed in section 5.2.2, (ii) next we train our proposed model on
the smart generator and use a discriminator as described in section 5.2.3. For both the cases we
performed the training on the data collected from the authentic PUs. We notice that the discrim-
inator trained on the dumb generator was able to detect the EPUs with 49.22% accuracy before
the GAN training. Whereas, the discriminator trained on smart generator was able to do that with
50.15% accuracy. This slight improvement is due to the one extra layer of neurons in the smart
discriminator. However, the overall achieved accuracy is far below expectations. The discrimina-
tor is naive and can distinguish the EPUs from the legitimate PUs only with ∼ 50% of accuracy,
which is similar to what one would obtain for random guessing.
(a) 50 Epochs (b) 100 Epochs (c) 150 Epochs
Figure 5.6: Generator and Discriminator Loss of GAN Model with Dumb EPU
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5.2.4.1 Training Phase
We train both the generator and discriminator through iterative sequential learning to strengthen
the generative and discriminative model over time. We use categorical cross-entropy training on
Adam [42] optimizer for gradient based optimization. We use 90%, 5%, and 5% of the total data
for training, cross-validation and testing respectively.
We experimented with several training paradigms for training the GAN models in order to get the
best performance from it. This leads us to train both the models in a 3-step approach. We first
train the models for 50 epochs with learning rate of 10−4 and 10−3 for generator and discriminator
respectively. Next, we train the models for another 50 epochs with lower learning rates of 10−5
and 10−4 for G(z) and D(x) respectively. In the last 50 epochs, we decrement both the learning
rates by 1/10 again. Notice that in each epoch, the learning rate of generator is lower than the dis-
criminator, as we want the generator to learn precisely about the possible data distribution (pz(z))
of PUs for better EPU emulation. However, we give the discriminator more layers to be able to
accurately learn the decision boundary in order to eventually overpower the generator. It is clear
from the Fig. 5.6, that the generator’s loss starts to decrease and the discriminator’s loss starts to
increase at the beginning. However, after a certain number of epochs, both the losses saturate.
The generator-loss, with the dumb generator fluctuates more and reaches saturation later (after 30
epochs); whereas the generator-loss with smart generator reaches saturation within less than 20
epochs, as shown in Fig.5.7. This result bolsters the intuition that knowing some of the PUs fea-
tures will make the generators smart at emulating the PUs and this in turn will make the system
converge faster. The discriminator’s behavior is more or less stable for both the models. Once both
the models are trained, we proceed to the deployment phase.
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(a) 50 Epochs (b) 100 Epochs (c) 150 Epochs
Figure 5.7: Generator and Discriminator Loss of GAN Model with Smart EPU
5.2.4.2 Deployment Phase
During the deployment phase, we randomly choose over-the-air signal data from EPUs and SUs.
We collect 4000 signal data from legitimate SUs and 4000 signal data from EPUs. We programmed
USRP B210s [26] to work as SUs and EPUs. These EPUs use same sample size and sample
space as the PUs, making themselves indistinguishable to the normal discriminator (trained with-
out GAN). We observe ∼ 50% EPU detection rate prior to GAN training. However, after the
discriminator is trained and learned the data distribution (pz(z)) of the EPUs, we get better de-
tection rate. We achieved a 98.04% accuracy from the discriminator which was trained using the
dumb generator and 99.5% accuracy from the discriminator which was trained using the smart
generator. These results are presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Accuracies for Different Implementations
Before GAN Training After GAN Training
D with Dumb G Training 49.22% 98.04%
D with Smart G Training 50.15% 99.5%
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(a) Dumb Generator (b) Smart Generator
Figure 5.8: Confusion Matrices with Dumb and Smart EPUs: before GAN Training
(a) Dumb Generator (b) Smart Generator
Figure 5.9: Confusion Matrices with Dumb and Smart EPUs at Deployment Phase: after GAN
Training
5.2.4.3 Performance Analysis
Using accuracy as a measure of efficacy of an algorithm can sometimes be incomplete and mis-
leading depending on the type of data, such as the case for skewed data. A confusion matrix
overcomes those problems by showing a relative relation between false positives and false nega-
tives and actual data labels. Hence we present the confusion matrices for both the experiments of
deployment phase, in Fig. 5.8, and 5.9. It is evident from Fig. 5.8, that almost all of the signals are
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predicted to be transmitted from SU, giving an accuracy of∼50%. So, the discriminator is not able
to distinguish between EPU and SU, thus predicting all as SU. However, the confusion matrices
after the GAN training has lower false positive and false negative rates. We also notice that the
false positives and false negatives are higher in case of the GAN model which was trained over
dumb generator. In summary,
• We achieve ∼50% accuracy of EPU detection using the discriminator trained without the
GAN for both type of proposed models, during deployment phase.
• During training, we observe 100% training accuracy for both dumb and smart GAN models.
• The trained discriminator with dumb and smart generator training gives testing accuracy of
98% and 99.5% respectively during the deployment phase.
• The proposed GAN based model can be applied for any type of cognitive radio transmitter
irrespective of PU or SU’s properties. We achieve 98-99% accuracy of EPU detection after
the dumb generator training. So without any knowledge of PU properties, the proposed
model is capable of detecting PUE attackers with 98% accuracy. Some “prior” information
can boost up the accuracy to 99.5%.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we present a robust defense mechanism against PUE attack in a cognitive radio net-
work. We design GAN based models considering (a) no prior information and (b) prior information
about the PUs. We call them as dumb and smart GAN models respectively. Through testbed evalu-
ations, we show that the GAN training for both kind of generators give a competitive accuracy for
EPU or PUE attacker detection during the deployment phase. However, GAN model with smart
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generator training achieves better accuracies and faster saturation than the dumb one. Both models
are able to detect the malicious and selfish PUE attacker with more than 98% of accuracy. Extend-
ing this concept towards providing security for other issues in wireless communication, could be
one of the next steps to consider.
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CHAPTER 6: PRIMARY USER’S ACTIVITY PREDICTION
In this chapter, we present recurrent neural network models which are able to accurately predict
the primary users’ activity in dynamic spectrum access (DSA) networks so that the secondary
users can opportunistically access the unused spectrum. Using Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral (USRP) Software Defined Radios (SDRs), we collect over-the-air data from 8 primary users
and train the learning models that we use in conjunction with a central spectrum sensor. We start
by implementing two machine learning models: (i) traditional linear regression and (ii) neural
network model using Long Short Term Memory (LSTM). These models are able to predict the
primary users’ activity with 75% and 97% accuracy respectively. To further improve the predic-
tion accuracy, we exploit the spatio-temporal correlation in the collected data by implementing
a Convolutional LSTM model– which achieves 99% accuracy for predicting the long-term activ-
ity of primary users. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed models are able to
successfully predict the primary users’ activities, thereby reducing both the under-utilizations and
interference violations in DSA networks. To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation is the first
one to propose a strategy for long term prediction of the activity of the primary user [100].
This chapter is organized as follows: we present the system model and problem formulation in
section 6.1 and different prediction models in section 6.2. The testbed setup and experimental
results are presented in section 6.3. The contents of this chapter appeared in [80].
6.1 Problem Description
In this section, we lay out the assumptions, present the system model, and formulate the problem.
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6.1.1 Primary User Activity Pattern
The primary users alternate between ON (busy) and OFF (idle) periods. Random variables ron
and roff determine the duration ofON andOFF periods respectively. The probability distribution
of rON and roff depends on the specific activity pattern of the primary user. We assume that the
primary user’sON andOFF times are independently and identically distributed and use a Poisson
point process to model them. Thus we model the probability distributions for the ON and OFF








βon ron ≥ 0
0 ron < 0
(6.1)







βoff roff ≥ 0
0 roff < 0
(6.2)
where, βon and βoff are the mean ON and OFF times respectively.
We define the activity factor of the primary users as the ratio of the mean PU ON time to the sum





It must be noted that, it is not required to pre-define a model for learning; the proposed prediction




We assume that PUs and SUs co-exist in a geographical area. The SUs can utilize the spectrum
bands when they are not being used by the PUs. The PUs have priority and can transmit when
they need to. On the other hand, SUs always have backlogged traffic to transmit and must yield
to the PU as soon as they require the spectrum. The transmission times for the PUs obey the
pattern (distribution) as discussed earlier. As a result of this system model, prior knowledge of
PU activity is vital for SUs to effectively and efficiently share the spectrum. We assume that
there is a centralized spectrum sensor that monitors the PU transmission activities and maintains
records of all past observations. The trained models corresponding to the proposed neural network
architectures are co-located with the spectrum sensor and use the past observations as inputs in
order to predict the activity pattern of the PUs.
6.1.3 Problem Formulation
The trained neural network model predicts the primary user’s activity at time τ for the next Γ
timestamps and the SS sends that information to the secondary user. Depending on the prediction
information received from the spectrum sensor, the secondary user schedules its transmission for
the next Γ timestamps, thus minimizing the interference violation as well as the under-utilization.
We denote the states of the primary user’s and secondary user’s transmission as sPU and sSU . The
ON state of each is represented as 1, and OFF state as 0. We also denote tolerable thresholds for
interference violation and under-utilization as Ithr, and Uthr respectively.
At time τ , the trained model predicts the PU activity for the next Γ timestamps. In our system we
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let the SS inform the secondary user when it sees continuous PU inactivity for more than 50% of
the predicted Γ timestamps. Note that this is a heuristic for solving the underlying optimization
problem as given by equation 6.4. However in the most general setting, at the time τ , depending on
the information received from the SS, the secondary user sets its state sSU to 0 or 1 for the next Γ
timestamps. Let Ich(t) denote the indicator variable at time t (τ < t ≤ τ + Γ), indicating whether
the secondary user causes interference to the primary user on channel ch. Note that: Ich(t) =
sPU(t)×sSU(t). Similarly, letUch(t) denote an indicator variable representing the under-utilization
of ch channel at time t. Notice that: Uch(t) = sPU(t) + sSU(t), where + denotes the logical OR
operation. sPU(t) and sSU(t) represent the PU’s and SU’s states respectively at time t. We note that
a conservative strategy for dynamic spectrum allocation will result in under-utilization, whereas an
aggressive strategy will lead to a considerable amount of interference violation, as discussed in
connection to Fig. 1.2.
The secondary user can transmit on the channel when the primary user is in the OFF state (i.e.,
sPU = 0). It should terminate its transmission as soon as the primary user starts to transmit (i.e.,
sPU = 1). However, while the SU is transmitting (τ < t ≤ τ + Γ), it will not be aware of this
state change of the PU (that is it will not be able to detect the change in the Ich(t) states). Thus
the possibility of having accurate knowledge of Ich(t) will depend on how well the neural network
can model the underlying probability distribution of the activity of the primary user.
Finally, our objective is to maximally assign the secondary user to the ON state constrained over
the thresholds of interference violation (Ithr) and under-utilization (Uthr). Thus, the general prob-
lem can be formulated as follows: let the number of timestamps where the SU is active be denoted
by η where η can takes values between τ + 1 and τ + Γ. Then the problem can be formulated
as that of maximizing η subject to the constraints on the interference and under-utilization being
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6.2 Proposed RNN Based Prediction Models
We present two types of neural network models that leverage the temporal and spatio-temporal
correlation in the historical data of the PU activities, in order to predict future PU activities. We
take the I/Q values of over-the-air signal data as raw features for future state prediction, as the I/Q
values do not require further sophisticated signal processing. Hence they are capable of providing
an end-to-end solution for our problem using machine learning techniques.
6.2.1 Recurrent Neural Network Model
Fully-connected and convolutional neural networks that are traditionally used for deep learning
lack the capability to exploit the context available in temporal data. Additionally, there is the
problem of vanishing gradients, when trying to use back propagation with temporal data. Both
these problems are addressed by Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) [45] which we now describe
in brief in the context of our problem.
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6.2.1.1 Temporal Property of I/Q data
Given T training samples (for T timestamps) where each sample is a vector of size M , and each
component of the vector is a tuple (I,Q) ∈ C representing a number in the complex plane, we
represent this vector for a given time stamp t as xt = [[(I,Q)i]t; i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ] ∈ CM where
t = 1, 2, · · · , T , and use it as an input to the neural network. We use a sample size (M ) of 1024
as a default for our experiments. We want to find the probability of sPU(t) = 0 for the next input
vector (xt+1) for t = t+ 1. The probability P (sPU(t) = 0|xt+1) can be written as:
P (sPU(t) = 0|xt+1) =
P (xt|sPU(t) = 0)P (sPU(t) = 0)
P (xt|sPU(t) = 0)P (sPU(t) = 0) + P (xt|sPU(t) = 1)P (sPU(t) = 1)
(6.5)
where P (xt|sPU(t) = 0) and P (xt|sPU(t) = 1) are the conditional probabilities of xt given sPU(t)
was set to 0 and 1 respectively. P (sPU(t) = 0) and P (sPU(t) = 1) are the marginal probabilities,
values of which will depend on the activity factor of the primary user. The predicted value of
vector x at the next timestamp (t + 1) will depend on the predicted value of the current one [87],
which is given by:
x̃t+1 = arg max
xt+1
(P (xt+1|x̃t)) (6.6)
The details of used LSTM cell models are described in Section 3.3.3.1 in Chapter 3. We next
describe the overview of convolutional LSTM network.
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6.2.2 Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network
The recurrent neural networks using LSTM cells do not consider the spatial information encoded
in the input-to-state or state-to-state transitions [87]. However, there are many applications where
spatio-temporal correlation exists within the dataset. To address this issue, we use a convolution
within the recurrent structure of the RNN. We first discuss the spatio-temporal property of RF data
and then model a convolutional LSTM cell to exploit the same.
6.2.2.1 Spatio-temporal Property of I/Q Data
Suppose that a radio signal is represented as a time varying series over a spatial region using R
rows and C columns. Here R represents the time varying nature of the signal and as such in
our case it represents the total number of time stamps at which the signal was sampled (T in our
case). C on the other hand represents the total number of features sampled at each time stamp (in
our case its 2048 since there are 1024 features sampled each of dimension 2). Note that each
cell corresponding to one value of R and one value of C represents a particular feature (I or Q)
at a given point in time. In order to capture the spatial variation of the signal we need to con-
sider samples from the signal at consecutive time stamps. In our case we consider time intervals
of length γ and hence we represent this by sub-matrices of the original R × C matrix repre-
senting the whole time varying signal. Each of these sub-matrices have γ rows corresponding
to the selected timestamps and C columns. Thus in a nutshell: to capture the temporal property
only, we made use of a sequence of vectors for timestamps 1, 2, · · · , T , namely, x1, x2, · · · , xT
whereas now, to capture both spatial and temporal properties, we introduce a new vector χt,t+γ ,
which is formulated as: χt,t+γ = [xt, xt+1, · · · , xt+γ−1]. So the vector χt,t+γ eventually preserves
the spatial properties with an increment of γ in time. Thus, we get a sequence of new vectors
χ1,γ, χγ,2γ, · · · χt,t+γ, · · · , χt+(ψ−1)γ,t+ψγ , where ψ is bR/γc. We formulate the probability of pri-
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mary user to be idle (P (sPU(t) = 0|χt, t+γ)) for the next γ-length sequence as:
P (sPU(t) = 0|χt, t+γ) =
P (χt−γ, t|sPU(t) = 0)P (sPU(t) = 0)
P (χt−γ, t|sPU(t) = 0)P (sPU(t) = 0) + P (χt−γ, t|sPU(t) = 1)P (sPU(t) = 1)
(6.7)
The marginal probabilities for the primary user to be idle or busy are modeled as P (sPU(t) =
0) and P (sPU(t) = 1) respectively. P (χt−γ, t|sPU(t) = 0), and P (χt−γ, t|sPU(t) = 1) are the
conditional probabilities of χt−γ, t given sPU(t) was set to 0 and 1 respectively. The predicted
value of γ-length sequence vector χ at timestamp t will depend on the predicted value of the
previously predicted γ length sequence [87], which is given by:
χ̃t, t+γ = arg max
χt+1···χt+γ
(P (χt, t+γ|χ̃t−γ, t)) (6.8)
It must be noted that in our case γ = Γ where Γ is as described in Section 6.1.3.
6.2.2.2 The ConvLSTM Model
We model the ConvLSTM cell as presented in Fig. 6.1. It is similar to an LSTM cell, but the input
transformations and recurrent transformations are both convolutional in nature [87]. We formulate
the input values, cell state and hidden states as 3-dimensional vectors, where the first dimension
is the number of features (C/2) and varies over time, and the last two dimensions contain the
spatial information (rows (R) and columns (C)). The details of used ConvLSTM cell models are
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Figure 6.2: PU Activity Prediction Training of the Spectrum Sensor
6.2.3 Proposed PU Activity Prediction Model
We propose two models based on recurrent neural networks to train the spectrum sensor using the
historical data of primary user activities. The objective is to learn every primary user’s activity
pattern and use it for scheduling SU activity. We also use the traditional linear regression model
for prediction in order to test the performance of the neural network based models against classical
techniques. We present the training strategy of each model in Fig. 6.2. First, we divide the dataset
into subsets for training and validation. In each epoch, we validate the trained model on the val-
idation data and depending on the validation error we tune the hyper-parameters of each model.
A single epoch consists of a forward pass and a backward pass through the implemented architec-
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ture for the entire dataset. We normalize the data for both training and validation to balance each
feature. We design three different models using three different approaches on the normalized data.
The details of the RNN with ConvLSTM cells is presented in Fig. 6.3. The first two hidden layers
consist of ConvLSTM cells with 1024 and 256 filers respectively. The last two hidden layers are
Dense layers, applied after flattening the output from the last ConvLSTM layer. We also apply
Dropout [89] of 0.5 between the different layers to avoid over-fitting of the trained model. The
LSTM implementation is also similar, with the exception of not having the Flatten layer in between
the LSTM and Dense layers. Increasing the number of filters or layers did not help in achieving
higher accuracy for either of the models. The output layer consists of a fully connected Dense
layer with 1 neuron to generate the predicted value. We run and validate the training data for 50
epochs for both the LSTM and ConvLSTM models, beyond which we did not notice any further
improvement. During the testing phase, once we get the predicted values, we compare them with
































































Figure 6.3: RNN Implementation with ConvLSTM Cells for PU Activity Prediction
Next we present the conceptual overview of the deployment phase of the proposed prediction
models for a cognitive radio network as shown in Fig. 6.4. The trained models are deployed
within the spectrum sensor. The SS also collects and stores the historical data of all the primary
users for enough time to build a robust trained model. This trained model also gets updated on
the newly learned primary user’s activity after some specific duration of time. Determining the
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data collection time and model updating time are application specific. Once the spectrum sensor
can get a primary user’s absence prediction from the trained model, it relays the information to the
secondary users. The secondary users later access the idle channel in a cooperative manner, details











Figure 6.4: Deployment of the Proposed PU Prediction Model
6.3 Implementation and Results
In this section we present the details of our implementation and the experimental results.
6.3.1 Experimental Environment
In order to validate the proposed models, we collected over-the-air data in an indoor lab environ-
ment from 8 universal software radio peripheral (USRP) B210s [26] acting as primary users. We
name these 8 radios as PU#1 to PU#8. We collected the dataset on an i7 machine with 16 GB
RAM. We conducted the proposed model training and evaluation on a Ryzen 8 Core system with
64 GB RAM, a GTX 1080 Ti GPU unit with 11 GB graphics memory.
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Table 6.1: Collected Dataset Sizes for Different Primary Users









6.3.2 Data Collection Environment
The data collection environment is presented in Fig. 6.5. A random signal is generated using
GNURadio [29] and modulated with Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK). We programmed
the USRP B210s to alternate between ON or OFF states such that the activity factor remained
between 0.7 and 0.75. Thus, the collected dataset has more PU presence data than absence, which
helps the learning process. The duration of ON and OFF times follows the model described in
Section 6.1.1. We generated datasets of different sizes for different PUs. Collected dataset sizes
are presented in Table 6.1.
The transmitted signal is received by a RTL-SDR [60] that used the rtlsdr python library. The AND
gate (in Fig. 6.5) after the primary user block, is used to represent the fact that either the noise or
the signal from primary user is transmitted at a particular timestamp. Primary user’s OFF time
is the absence of radio signal data, therefore it is represented as “Noise". We generate different
datasets for all the primary users. The “over-the-air" transmission data was collected in an indoor
lab environment where the B210 transmitters and the RTL-SDR receiver were at a distance of 10
feet with a direct line of sight. Thus, the underlying channel can be best modeled as a Rician fading
















































Figure 6.6: I/Q Values Representation: (a) Signal Present (b) Noise
During the primary user’s ON time, the I/Q values were organized in a constellation (please refer
to Fig. 6.6(a)). During the primary user’s OFF time the I/Q values are random (please refer to
Fig. 6.6(b)). Each data sample had 2048 entities consisting of 1024 I and 1024 Q values. We chose
1024 as sample size as it was sufficient to capture the spatial properties and at the same time the
training was not computationally intensive. The configuration parameters for the radios are given
in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Primary User Transmission Configuration Parameters
Parameters Values
Transmitter Gain 45 dB




Primary Users USRP B210
Receiver RTL-SDR
# Primary Users 8
6.3.3 Signal to Noise Ratio of Data Collection Environment
To measure the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the testbed environment, we use a RTL-SDR [60]
dongle and Spektrum [69] which is an open source spectrum analyzer available for both Windows
and Linux. The screenshots of Spektrum are shown in Fig. 6.7 and 6.8 when the signal is absent
and present respectively. We calibrate the SNR using the Spektrum software (rather than using a
spectrum analyzer) in order to avoid the associated costs and also in order to show the robustness
of our methods to imprecise measurements (as measurements in software are always inferior to
actual hardware measurements). From Fig. 6.7, we found that the noise floor was between -20 dB
and -30 dB. Fig. 6.8 shows that the signal strength for the 200 KHz (from 904.9 MHz to 904.1
MHz) channel was between 0 dB and 10 dB. We set the transmitter gain to 45 dB and calculated
the SNR as the difference between the noise floor and the signal strength. Our calculated SNR was
5 dB - (-25 dB) = 30 dB, with a 45 dB transmitter gain. It is to be noted that the signal strengths
(in dB) of noise and signal measured by Spektrum is relative, but the difference between them is
absolute.
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Figure 6.7: Noise Floor Plot using Spektrum [69] Software
6.3.4 Used Machine Learning Libraries and Performance Metrics
We used Keras [18] as the frontend and Tensorflow [1] as the backend for desiging the proposed
neural network models. Keras is an overlay on neural network primitives with Tensorflow [1]
or Theano [2] that provides a customizable interface for quick deployment of complex neural
networks. We also use Numpy, Scipy and Matplotlib Python libraries for linear regression and
other traditional methods.
“Accuracy” is used as the typical performance metric to measure the effectiveness of the proposed
neural networks. However, accuracy can sometimes be misleading and incomplete when the data
is skewed. In our dataset, the total PU ON time is greater than OFF times, making the dataset
skewed. A confusion matrix overcomes this problem by showing how confused the classification
model is on its predictions. It provides more insights into the performance by identifying not only
the number of errors, but also the types of those, i.e., false positives and false negatives.
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Figure 6.8: Signal Level Plot using Spektrum [69] Software
We use accuracy and confusion matrix to demonstrate the reliability of the proposed models. We
show the interference violation and under-utilization to show the feasibility and applicability of the
proposed models in cognitive radio networks.
6.3.5 Experimental Results
We train three different machine learning models on the collected dataset of each primary user. The
linear regression model was straight forward and trained with 90% of each dataset. For both the
LSTM and ConvLSTM based models, we use 90%, 5%, and 5% of data for training, validation,
and testing respectively. During each training, we set the maximum epoch to 50 with an early
stopping condition, such as, if there is no improvement of validation loss for consecutive 5 epochs,
then the training is stopped. We choose 50 epochs because we observed through multiple runs of
training, that each model reaches optimum accuracy within 50 epochs. We use Adam [42] based
optimization with 10e−4 learning rate and mean squared error loss for training both the LSTM and
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ConvLSTM based models. We adjusted the hyper-parameter’s values such that the model gives the
best possible accuracy with training time trade-off.
Once each model is trained, we predict each primary user’s activity for the next 4000 timestamps
using the proposed models. We only present last 50 timestamps of those 4000 timestamps in
Fig 6.9, for better display quality and understanding. The plot demonstrates the primary user’s
presence and absence using a threshold on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) for PU#1.
The threshold is application specific; it is set to -10 dB for our testbed. Although PU#1’s activity
factor was set between 0.7 to 0.75, we see more absence for the last 50 timestamps, which shows
the robustness of the data collection procedure. It is evident from the plots that the predicted
values for both primary user’s presence and absence are getting closer to actual values for LSTM
and ConvLSTM models, however, ConvLSTM yields the best results. We observe similar results
for the other primary users (PU#2 - P#8) as well, plots are given in Appendix.
6.3.5.1 Analysis on Proposed Prediction Models
The prediction accuracy for all the primary users (PU#1 - PU#8), for all the proposed models are
presented in Table 6.3. We notice that linear regression gives 73-76% accuracy, whereas the LSTM
and ConvLSTM models manage to get 97%-99% accuracies respectively. This phenomenon can
be justified by the presence of correlation within the recurrent structure of RF data. The linear
regression based model does not leverage that property. The LSTM based model exploits only the
temporal property of that recurrent structure giving a better accuracy (∼97%). However, ConvL-
STM based model exploits the spatio-temporal property within the data and hence gives the best
accuracy(∼99% - 100%) among all the proposed prediction models for all the 8 primary users.
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(a) Presence@LR (b) Absence@LR
(c) Presence@LSTM (d) Absence@LSTM
(e) Presence@ConvLSTM (f) Absence@ConvLSTM
Figure 6.9: Predictions of last few Timestamps for different Models for PU#1
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6.3.5.2 Performance of ConvLSTM Model
Figure 6.10: Prediction accuracy for ConvLSTM
The accuracies for training and validation are presented in Fig. 6.10 for PU#1. It is observed that
training and validation accuracy saturates within a few epochs of the start of training. The model
behaves in the same manner for the other PUs as well. Once the ConvLSTM model is trained, we
find the confusion matrices for all the 8 PUs for the next 4000 timestamps, as presented in Fig. 6.11.
Since the PU’s activity factor was set between 0.7 and 0.75, we notice a skewed behavior for the
total presence and absence times of the primary users respectively. It is clear from the confusion
matrices that the ConvLSTM based model yields negligible numbers of false positives and false
negatives during the deployment phase.
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(a) PU#1 (b) PU#2
(c) PU#3 (d) PU#4
(e) PU#5 (f) PU#6
(g) PU#7 (h) PU#8
Figure 6.11: Confusion Matrices for Prediction using ConvLSTM for 8 PUs
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Table 6.3: Accuracies of Implemented Models for different Primary Users
Linear RNN RNN
Regression (LSTM) (ConvLSTM)
PU #1 73.98% 97.62% 100%
PU #2 77.60% 97.83% 99.95%
PU #3 75.15% 97.92% 100%
PU #4 75.15% 97.60% 99.98%
PU #5 75.80% 97.88% 99.98%
PU #6 74.58% 97.62% 99.98%
PU #7 74.72% 97.75% 100%
PU #8 76.75% 97.72% 99.98%
Table 6.4: Comparison of Interference Violation and Under-utilization for the Proposed Models
for PU#1
Techniques Interference IV Under UU
Violation (IV ) Change Utilization (UU ) Change
Conservative 1043 - 1478 -
Linear 1041 ↓0.2% 15 ↓98.9%
Regression
RNN-LSTM 7 ↓99.3 % 6 ↓99.5%
RNN-ConvLSTM 0 ↓100 % 0 ↓100%
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6.3.5.3 Analysis on Interference Violations and Under-utilization
We calculate the total number of interference violations (IV ) and under-utilization (UU ) for each
model. Table 6.4 presents the total numbers and improvement of IV and UU after using all the
proposed learning models, over using the conservative allocation strategies. It is clear that the long-
term prediction from ConvLSTM based model has no interference violation and under-utilization.
Fig. 6.12 gives the graphical overview of how the IV and UU change as the time increases for
all types of models. It is evident that the cumulative number of interference violation is signifi-
cantly high for the conservative approach than the proposed learning based models. However, the
cumulative under-utilization is high for both the conservative and linear regression models. The
changes of LSTM and ConvLSTM based models are not quite visible in this figure, so we present
the enhanced view of their changes in Fig. 6.13.
(a) Interference Violations (b) Under-utilization
Figure 6.12: Cumulative Interference Violations and Under-utilization for Conservative and all
Proposed Models for PU#1
In summary we have shown that, (1) Linear regression based model gives 73-76% accuracy for
primary user’s activity prediction. (2) LSTM based recurrent neural network model increases that
accuracy to 97% for the activity prediction of all the 8 primary users. (3) ConvLSTM based RNN
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model gives the best accuracy (∼100%) for the long-term prediction of primary user’s activity.
(4) The ConvLSTM based model also decreased the number of interference violations and under-
utilizations by 100% compared to the conservative one. (5) Trained ConvLSTM based RNN mod-
els can be deployed in a central spectrum sensor for a robust and efficient cognitive radio network.
(a) Interference Violations (b) Under-utilization
Figure 6.13: Enhanced Comparison of Cumulative Interference Violations and Under-utilization
for the Proposed Models for PU#1
6.3.5.4 Computational Complexities
We focus on the computational time complexity for the training phase only, as the trained model
gives the output within constant time (O(1)) during the deployment phase. Computing the time
complexity for training a neural network is still evolving. In [51], the authors proved that a neural
network of depth δ can be trained in poly(s2δ), where s is the dimension of the input, and poly(.)
takes a polynomial time depending on the machine configuration. Here s depends on the dataset
size.
Suppose each dataset has T samples. As mentioned earlier, we use 95% of data for training and
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validation purpose. The complexity for RNN models with 6 layers using 95% of T data samples
for training and validation, is poly(0.95 × Te326). For linear regression model, the complexity is
O(p2T + p3), where p is the number of features. The prediction complexity is O(p).
6.4 Summary
The opportunistic usage of spectrum by secondary users has the possibility of leading to a uni-
form and efficient usage of overly crowded radio frequency bands. In this regard we present the
use of machine learning techniques to predict the possible opportunities for such spectrum usage
by secondary users. We investigate the spatio-temporal aspect of over-the-air radio data for that
purpose. The long-term pattern of primary user’s ON and OFF times are learned by the proposed
neural network models. The comparative analysis with linear regression shows that exploiting
the recurrent structures with respect to temporal and spatial variations achieves the best possible
accuracy, as seen from the proposed prediction models. Leveraging the memory of earlier trans-
mission helps the sensing network to determine primary user activity pattern accurately over time.
Successful implementation of the proposed models will improve spectrum utilization and lower
interference violation for dynamic spectrum access networks.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we addressed some of the fundamental challenges on how to effectively apply
different learning techniques in the RF domain. In the presence of adversaries, malicious activi-
ties such as jamming, and spoofing are inevitable which render most machine learning techniques
ineffective. To facilitate learning in such settings, we proposed an adversarial learning-based ap-
proach to detect unauthorized exploitation of RF spectrum. First, we showed the applicability of
existing machine learning algorithms in the RF domain. We designed and implement three recur-
rent neural networks using different types of cell models for fingerprinting RF transmitters. Next,
we focused on securing transmissions on dynamic spectrum access network where PUE attacks
can pose a significant threat. We presented a GAN based solution to counter such PUE attacks.
Ultimately, we proposed recurrent neural network models which are able to accurately predict the
primary users’ activities in DSA networks so that the secondary users can opportunistically access
the shared spectrum. We implemented the proposed learning models on testbeds consisting of US-
RPs working as Software Defined Radios (SDRs). Results revealed significant accuracy gains in
accurately characterizing RF transmitters- thereby demonstrating the potential of our models for
real world deployments.
We argued that most machine learning techniques would not be effective in adversarial settings
and that breakthroughs in GAN can be instrumental in detection of rogue transmitters and accurate
identification of known ones in adversarial settings. We proposed and implemented a generative
model and a discriminative model for the GAN. We collected over-the-air raw I/Q data using USRP
B210 and used that to train the GAN. The discriminator was able to detect rogue transmitters
with an accuracy of ∼99.9%. As for transmitter classification, we first implemented a convolu-
tion neural network (accuracy ∼89%) for exploiting the correlation between I/Q data. Then we
designed and implemented deep neural network and recurrent neural networks that showed accu-
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racies around 97% for trusted transmitter identification. We also showed how the proposed neural
network models (especially CNN) faired when radios from different manufacturers were used.
As we got promising results for “transmitter fingerprinting" using convolutional and recurrent neu-
ral network both, we wanted to explore the spatial and as well as temporal properties of RF data.
So we appraoched towards exploiting both the inherent spatial and temporal properties for a buld-
ing a robust “transmitter fingerprinting" approach. We modeled the temporal and spatio-temporal
correlations in RF data. We explored that using temporal correlation only, the RNNs can achieve
upto 95-97% of classification accuracy by using LSTM or GRU cell models. Whereas, exploitation
of spatio-temporal properties boosted up the accuracy to 98-99% by using ConvLSTM cell model.
The presence of adversaries can potentially cause some attack on the wireless network system.
To that end, we considered one significant attack, PUE attack, in a CRN. We presented a robust
defense meachnishm against PUE attack by proposing two GAN based models. We catergorized
the proposed GAN model based on the availability of prior information. The dumb generator-
discriminator model did not have any prior knowledge about the attacker, then also acheived 98%
accuracy of PUE attacker detection. Whereas the smart generator-discriminator model leveraged
the prior informations to acheive around 99.5% accuracy to catch the PUE attackers.
As of the PU activity prediction is concerned, we presented different ML techniques to predict the
“long-term" acitivities of the PUs. We leveraged both the temporal, and spatio-temporal aspect
of RF data in proposed a recurrent neural networks consisting of LSTM and ConvLSTM cells
respectively. We found that the long-term pattern of primary user’sON andOFF times are learned
by the proposed neural network models. We noticed the proposed RNN models outperform the
traditional linear regression method for predictions. The proposed ConvLSTM model gives 99.9-
100% accuracy of long term prediction by leveraging the memory of earlier transmissions. Such
accuracte predictions eventually improved spectrum utilization and lower interference violation for
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DSA networks.
7.1 Goal of the Dissertation
With more and more autonomous deployments of wireless networks, accurate knowledge of the
radio frequency (RF) environment is becoming indispensable. For example, a wireless sensor net-
work relies on trustworthy signals; however, malicious transmitters can contaminate the signals
and jeopardize the utility of the sensor network. Existence of such threats underscore the need
for techniques that recognize and authenticate the identity of transmitters, irrespective of the net-
work protocols and communication technologies being used. In recent years, there has been a
proliferation of autonomous systems that use machine learning algorithms on large scale historical
data. When using ML techniques for communication networks, malicious entities, such as rogue
transmitters can alter the signal, hence the data. Such threats and their ease of implementation in
communication networks necessitates the use of robust learning algorithms, that are agnostic to the
network and radio parameters. In this dissertation, we demonstrated the use of adversarial machine
learning for the task of robust RF transmitter characterization.
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APPENDIX : PU ACTIVITY
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(a) PU#1 LR (b) PU#1 LSTM (c) PU#1 ConvLSTM
(d) PU#2 LR (e) PU#2 LSTM (f) PU#2 ConvLSTM
(g) PU#3 LR (h) PU#3 LSTM (i) PU#3 ConvLSTM
(j) PU#4 LR (k) PU#4 LSTM (l) PU#4 ConvLSTM
Figure .1: Predictions of last few Timestamps for different Models for PU#1 - PU#4
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(a) PU#5 LR (b) PU#5 LSTM (c) PU#5 ConvLSTM
(d) PU#6 LR (e) PU#6 LSTM (f) PU#6 ConvLSTM
(g) PU#7 LR (h) PU #7 LSTM (i) PU#7 ConvLSTM
(j) PU#8 LR (k) PU#8 LSTM (l) PU#8 ConvLSTM
Figure .2: Predictions of last few Timestamps for different Models for PU#5 - PU#8
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